



Viable Scenarios of 
exploiting Greek Natural 
Gas Reserves within 
Geopolitical Turmoil of SE 
Mediterranean: Security 
Issue and Antagonistic 
Challenges 
Christos D. Vlachos 
 
 
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES, SOCIAL SCIENCES & ECONOMICS 
A thesis submitted for the degree of  
Master of Science (MSc) in Energy Law, Business, Regulation and Policy 
 
 
January 2021  








Student Name:  Christos D. Vlachos 
SID:  1108180012 







I hereby declare that the work submitted is mine and that where I have made use of 




















This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Energy Law, Business, Regulation 
and Policy at the International Hellenic University.  
The current thesis discusses the complex geopolitical Game that engages the most 
important Players (States) using utterly pivotal geostrategic coefficients; Security-
Sovereignty-Autonomy-Energy, in the sub-system of South East Mediterranean Sea, 
which coincides with the South East NATO Wing. State-entities are the main players 
and enormous national interests are at stake.  
Dissertation starts with an argument to link national security to energy security and 
how this formats and defines a state’s Grand Strategy. 
At the first part the several aspects of energy security incorporation in EU states are 
highlighted. The impacts to the environment and the strict policies towards a greener 
and cleaner energy future are coupling Greece and EU to a common framework, away 
from carbon, named “NECP” inwards part of EU “Green Deal” planning. 
The gas neo-reserves are the connecting bond with the second part; the geopolitical 
constraints  that shape Greek policy and define its course of actions, are utilizing its 
tools by its politicians mind-set, using an outer-European mechanism, which is adopted 
to South-Eastern Mediterranean essential facts and knowledge, since Greece is located 
in the crossroad of three continents. 
By illuminating “The Way to Autonomy” via the capitalization of gas neo-reserves we 
are entering the second part, where an attempt to assess and esteem the value of the 
multilateral partnerships in East Mediterranean that were shaped the previous years 
(trilaterals-EMGF) is made. The Great Projects planned to change the region’s Energy 
Map are introduced and the new security architecture is projected, which will allegedly 
lead to member-states fortification; under the fundamental term that maritime 
disputes will settle calmly.   
On the above basis, the interminable Greece-Turkey bilateral disputes are presented 
and Turkey’s arrogations are catholically deconstructed by the consultation of the 
predominant Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), where my thinking arrow is reaching to the 
core of this thesis, the Scenarios and Feasibility of Gas Exploration in Greek waters by 
their sole proprietor. Through the analysis of “Points of Friction” and each scenario’s 
reflections, is argued that the key to the utilization of its maritime wealth is for Greece 
a strong inter-partnership scheme with security element present, a qualitative and 
forceful deterrence power and a decisive non-dilatory political willingness and coercive 
statecraft. 
In the end, the Conclusions chapter attempts to predict, but not to preconceive the 
remaining options in the menu for Greece and the dissertation closes by alerting the 
decision making parties to act fast and think creatively, as the post-Covid-19 era, that 
we’re now approaching, steers country to unmapped waters, that require proactive 
foresight and vigilance.   
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PREFACE 
As an officer of the Hellenic Air Force I have always been attracted by solid and 
tangible topics such as the Geopolitical Front. Energy is a vulgate geopolitical factor, 
which delivers not only prosperity and growth but even survivability to a state and that 
was a strong initiative to deflect from the common to me, engineering (Aviation) field 
of expertise and turn to the International Affairs and Security  pitch, thus attaining my 
2nd Msc Academic Degree. 
My previous master’s thesis about the “Security Networks 3+1 in South East 
Mediterranean” dealing with the trilateral partnerships in the South East 
Mediterranean Sea (security-oriented benefits and implications) and my continuously 
growing apprehension about the developments in my country’s regional and territorial 
waters and its overall stagnation of taking national initiatives in the energy sector, 
propelled my willingness to engage with this thesis as the “swansong” of my IHU 
studies. 
The following thesis dissertation is addressed not only to academics, geopoliticians, 
energy experts, or research students and entities (colleges, institutes, etc) but also to 
all citizens with sensitized interests and common ground to national perspectives, that 
are concerned about Greece’ future fate, which is fundamentally based on energy 
security narrative, particularly at the post Covid-19 era, where all pawns in the whilom 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays and for the existing natural resources under exploitation natural gas 
accounts for the cleanest fossil fuel considering its emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
gases. Inevitably, despite the Covid-19 implications, natural gas market is expected to 
experience a relative growth in the future.  
1. Importance of “Energy Security” 
 As a definition for the term “Energy Security” can be ascribed the long-term 
security of supply and its connection to international politics in the areas of 
diversification, infrastructure, investments and market governance. 
Synonym to the ability to maintain and reserve sufficient amount of 
hydrocarbon resources (predominantly oil and later natural gas), Energy Security is, for 
the Western World-given unidimensionally-equivalent to the Security of Supply 
(consumer’s view). In other words, being able to function not only its industrialized 
economy, but primarily to sustain and guarantee the perpetuation of a prosperous, 
modern society, is a desideratum for a state and a proviso for its sovereignty.   
On the above evergreen unaltered definition, more erudite aspects imposed by 
the current geopolitical evolutions and economic developments, have been 
introduced: Rising oil prices, terror-wave originated instability, the Arab Spring 
uprising, the global demand transferal towards fast-growing Asian economies, the 
increasing rate of fail-states among which some serious energy producers, are factors 
that dictate new dimensions in the energy security perception, such as energy security 
from the view of producers (security of demand), environmental concerns and 
sustainable development (the resulted externalities from production, consumption, 
transportation of fossil fuels to the climate change and the ecosystem, in general), 
(e.g., Yergin 2006; Sovacool 2011; Dyer and Trombetta 2013). In individual level of 
study, issues such as human and social security (equity, access to energy services), 
energy poverty and distribution of revenues from exploitation over national energy 
resources, are also facets indicating the multidimensional nature and importance of 
Energy Security. 
Moreover energy sectors traditionally considered as “secure” are latterly due to 
globalization and liberalization of legislation that governs those sectors, adding up high 
value to the security paradigm. Such sectors are electricity, nuclear energy, hydro 
(management of dams) and the modern associated risks are market manipulation, 
natural disasters and unfortunate events, such as terrorism attacks and nationalism 
(radically generated) of resources. 
It is inexorable for a consumer country under these circumstances, to set as 
ultimate priority and a basic aspect of its foreign policy the safeguarding of its energy 
future needs and secure adequate supply of gas and oil over all conditions. By adding a 
constant stress and tension to its relations with other counterpart nations and setting 
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a rally of fortifying the necessary quantities from the producer countries, it is building 
in a sense a competitive block of relations that produces insecurity and in some cases 
hostile actions to competitors. On the other hand, being the keeper of vast reserves of 
fundamental energy resources has proved to be catastrophic during the past major 
wars (WWI-WWII). Even further, it revealed that the road to future energy dependency 
was unidirectional and would have to pass through international politics and 
diplomacy, since energy resources are not evenly spread among the globe and hard 
power would rarely serve as an energy insurer for a country especially when it’s not a 
global or at least a peripheral actor. The 70’s oil shock along with the Gulf Wars of the 
90’s set the rails of antagonism over energy security, highlighting with a very 
convincing manner the necessary variable strategies that had to be developed 
thereafter to maintain energy dependency. These strategies would also prevent from 
disruptions and the effects of extreme commercialization, closing the gates 
permanently to the post-colonial era and opening the ones of diversification, re-
rooting the energy tracks and introducing the definitions “short and long-term” energy 
security.  
2. Grand Strategy, Energy Security and Foreign Policy 
In our effort to outline and establish the notion of a state’s “Grand Strategy” 
we can use Silove’s definition (2017) according to which “A state’s grand strategy 
reflects its basic principles and/or policies in the long term, as it describes its highest 
priorities in all spheres of statecraft (e.g., military, diplomatic, and economic)”. And its 
true as grand strategy consists of all those ways that national power (hard and soft) is 
utilized and prioritized towards the achievement of the state’s long term goals and 
materialization of prospects, for what is destined to be the national security ideal, that 
guarantees the nation’s existence and continuation through all times.  
In the light of the above we realize that one fundamental aspect of a nation’s 
trend to secure its very existence is to preserve uninterrupted energy supply, in a 
nutshell called Energy Security. We well saw above that Energy Security is not a fixed 
object. Energy stands not only as a source of potential economic grow, hence 
determining the state of its economy in an absolute manner, but also the ability of a 
country to reach, acquire, maintain and use on its people willpower energy supplies, 
pledges and warranties its national security. 
This strong bond between grand strategy and energy security derives from 
energy’s dual attributes concerning economy and sovereignty, the former providing 
necessary revenues for development and the latter constitutes a national asset that 
consolidates state’s domestic order and external influence. These political features of 
energy establish several incentives in terms of state’s sovereignty violation, for others 
to engage and assert ownership, access, transport and sale and arrogate exploitation 
of this strategic significance good which proves to be a “source of relative power” 
(Hadfield 2012, 442). Therefore, energy is the key driver of a grand strategy’s three 
main components: ends (securing sufficient energy at affordable prices), ways 
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(instruments or tools to pursue non energy goals), and means (revenue for pursuing 
non-energy goals) (O’Sullivan 2013, 32).  
In the light of the above, we can introduce a new definition, more accurate for 
the energy security and directly linked to a nation’s grand strategy as: “ A state retains 
adequate Energy Security when it has unlimited access to affordable energy supply 
(resources or trade) without waiving its claim to conduct solely its political, diplomatic, 
security and military affairs and/or altering its statehood significantly”. The attempted 
definition clearly stresses another more modern and progressive characteristic for 
energy as a foreign policy tool for states. 
Taking into account that strategic prominence of energy resources is connected 
with political and economic weaknesses of all resource dependent states, it’s sensible 
to assume that those concerning states will respond accordingly by formatting their 
domestic and foreign strategies. This “modified” language of international affairs 
includes all anxieties/keys in its newly constructed alphabet (maintaining adequate 
supplies, political leverage exercised by producer-states) and it is best represented by 
foreign policy administrations of a state. Linking with the above sub-chapter where we 
analyzed the importance of energy security in the modern politics we set as milestone 
incident for the “entanglement” of foreign policy the Oil Shock of the 70’s. Both short 
and long-term (not respectively as short-term security is mostly based in 
internal/domestic governmental strings of actions) energy security assumes interstate 
cooperation mechanisms such as interventions intended to prevent energy crises 
(excessive price increases or supply disruptions). Foreign policy toolkits also involve 
diversification of suppliers and routes, preferment of domestic energy sources, 
promotion of international energy markets and support for the investments necessary 
to develop adequate resources and infrastructure to match energy demand. 
Striving for the uninterrupted progress and prosperity, states through their 
foreign policy imply all available forms of interaction, dialogue and cooperation 
between other consumer and producer states and between governments and market 
actors deploying all of their statecraft arsenal. 
3. Natural Gas Security 
Natural gas is, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fastest 
growing fossil fuel, accounting today for 23% of global primary energy demand and 
nearly a quarter of electricity generation (IEA, 2020). As the cleanest burning fossil 
fuel, natural gas delivers numerous eco-friendly benefits in comparison to other fossil 
fuels, principally considering air quality and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
Storability and operational adoptability of gas-fired power plants, allow natural 
gas to sustain not only seasonal but also short-term demand fluxes and to boost 
electricity supply security in power generating systems where multiple renewable 
resources are engaged.  
Globalization of natural gas market is an inflating phenomenon, due to the 
earliest expansion of shale gas availability and the intensifying supplies of flexible 
liquefied natural gas (LNG). The increment of global gas trade, leads to the 
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interconnectivity and improvement of gas markets proximity, generating new aspects 
and extents of natural gas security, sensitizing increasingly the response amplitude and 
intensity of distant regions over a potential demand or supply shock anywhere in the 
world. 
Provided that natural gas is the energy resource at issue, a range of further 
political and economic correlated features supervene. Suggested as an 
environmentally friendly alternative and also a transition fuel towards 2050 (arrival 
milestone to achieve net-zero emissions from Paris Agreement Objectives), natural gas 
due to its low carbon emissions - unlike other types of plants, gas plants can be easily 
fired up and down and emit 50% less carbon dioxide than coal when burned (European 
Commission 2016) - is added to global energy arsenal dynamically and irreversibly. As 
IEA’s prognostication of being the second largest energy source no later than 2030, its 
more than obvious that natural gas emerges as one of the most robust and substantial 
component of energy security. 
EU imports more than half of the energy it consumes, while numerous member 
states are deeply reliant on a single supplier for crucial energy sources. This is mainly 
true for gas, hence the EU remains susceptible to supply disruptions, whether caused 
by geopolitical struggles, political or marketable disputes and infrastructure failures. 
This substantial dependence on so few suppliers has been recognized since the 1990s, 
and the European Commission has made various efforts to downgrade its dependence 
on imports and make the concept of energy supply diversification a foundation stone 
of EU energy policy (Grätz 2011, 61-86). 
However, natural gas trade is mainly regional and its distribution depends on 
permanent projects based on long-lasting infrastructures (pipelines and LNG facilities), 
and securitized contracts highly sensitive to geopolitical instability and 
rearrangements. Europe’s overall annual gas consumption is still fulfilled 
predominantly by Russia (over one-third of its natural gas supply), also by Norway and 
other countries including Algeria, although gas production in Norway is gradually 
declining as its fields mature (Coote 2016). In 2019 net imports raised to 18,95EJ-Gross 
In the lowermost of demand projections, import needs could be about 20 bcm higher 
than 2015 levels by 2025(fig.1-2). Therefore, EU gas imports will carry on holding a 
major share in the future EU gas markets in the EU diversification-policy framework for 
gas supplies.  
Consequently, the term “Natural Gas Security” is an enhanced facet of energy 
security, requiring stronger and abiding bonds and horizons among all implicating 
parties (companies, states, organizations) a predictable and stable geopolitical and 
economic environment and a long term certainty, founded on inter-governmental 
agreements which guarantee supply. It is quite obvious that Natural Gas Security self-
contains its own dynamics: For instance a natural gas supply chain (i.e., upstream, 
midstream, and downstream) has considerable potential to trigger (geo)political 
tensions that could disrupt gas supply itself. 
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Α. THE GENERAL ENERGY STATUS OF GREECE 
Despite the fact that the word energy derives from Greek ἐνέργεια (energeia), which 
appeared for the first time in the 4th century BCE works of Aristotle (OUP V, 240, 
1991), the story of energy in Greece is not an old one. 
1. The Energy Situation in Greece 
The majority of necessary energy needs in Greece are covered from imports, 
while the Greek Energy sector is one of the most fossil fuels-dependent in European 
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    (Table 2: Net energy imports, Greece 1990-2019) 
 
Obviously, as represented in the tables above in the previous year 2019 
petroleum products alone served approximately 50% of country’s energy 
requirements, which were not only used in transport sector, but also redirected to 
electricity production sector. A typical energy-intensive province is the Aegean 
archipelago, where total energy needs are fed by petroleum fueled expensive and 
inefficient diesel generators.   
Natural gas which, for the time being is imported in a relatively high cost, holds 
a sizable share in total state’s energy requirements and this trend shows high growing 
rate and generates even wider expectations for the future.  
 
 
(Table 3: Electricity generation by source, Greece 1990-2019) 
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In addition, domestic resources include rapidly declining lignite which 
represents around 29% of electricity generation for the year 2018 (22,1%-2019) as well 
as renewable energy sources (RES) such as hydro-power, wind, solar energy and 
biomass, which accounted for 11,3%(8,4%-2019), 12,4%(14,9%-2019), 7,5%(8,2%-
2019) and 0,6%(3,3%-2019), respectively(Table 3). 
In terms of electricity production, Greece has made considerable progress and 
diversified fuel mix, mainly by augmenting the share of renewable energy, which 
increased to almost 34,8% of the total generation for the year 2019, which is a striking 
surge compared to the year 2006, when it was no more than 9%. As of December 
2019, a RES and heCHP power plans (no large hydro included) share of 6,97MW, were 
operating connected to the Greek National Grid.  Moreover, 3,607 MW of wind power 
plants, 2,793 MW of PV plants (including PV installations of the Special Photovoltaic 
Rooftop Programme), 240 MW of small hydro-power, 88 MW of biomass/biogas plants 
and 233 MW of heCHP plants were also connected in the National Power System of 
Greece.  
Greece’s energy sector today undergoes a huge €44 planned investments 
destined to liquefy in the new decade, transforming the country into a regional hub. 
Throughout land and sea, pipelines are being installed, wind farms are built, and the 
prospects for hydrocarbon reserves flutter. Eventually, the EU’s so-called Southern Gas 
Corridor, a vision of diversifying western Europe’s natural gas supplies – is now close to 
become reality. Three major gas pipelines, an array of subsea and underground 
electrical interconnections, and a new natural gas power plant are either in operation, 
under construction, or nearing completion. In the meantime, ventures in renewable 
energy are also soaring.  
Among the most important projects is the €4.5 billion Trans Adriatic Pipeline 
(TAP) being built across Greece, Albania, and onwards to Italy that will bring natural 
gas from Azerbaijan to Europe hopefully within 2021. Also, in 2018, EU approved 
construction of the Greece-Bulgaria Interconnector (IGB), a natural gas pipeline that 
will deliver gas Bulgaria from TAP, along with other sources (natural gas facility near 
Athens and the awaited one in northern Greece).  
In addition, a €370 million offshore floating LNG storage and regasification unit 
(FSRU) with a conduction pipeline planned to connect the floating unit to Greece’s 
transmission system will ignite its commercial operation at the early 2022.  
These ventures will terminate the country’s almost total dependence on 
Russian gas. 
As mentioned above, as a result of the numerous scattered Greek islands of all 
sizes, throughout Aegean Sea with uneven distances that harden connections to the 
mainland, electricity requirements are fulfilled via inefficient and costly diesel 
generators.  Thus, one of the most strategic projects that are due to alter the big 
energy picture in Greece is the interconnection of Crete with Attica via a submarine 
power cable. Worth €1 billion and set to be electrified by 2023, the Ariadne 
Interconnection Project will be one of the largest infrastructure projects in country’s 
history. With a future potential to link via undersea cable to the Cypriot and Israeli 
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electricity grids, “Ariadne” will enable Israel to deliver its excess electricity while 
targeting the end of Cyprus energy isolation. Separately, a €330 million project to 
connect Crete with the Greek mainland through a medium-capacity cable linking the 
island with the Peloponnese came in reality at late 2020. By its electrification, the line 
became the longest submarine alternating current (AC) interconnection in the world. 
Energy sector’s market liberalization is vast. Successive privatizations have 
already initiated, while others are about to. During the last three years a 24% stake has 
been sold in IPTO to China State Grid for €320 million and a 66% stake in DESFA (the 
state-owned natural gas transmission operator) to an international consortium for 
€535 million.  Energy companies such as Belgium’s Fluxys, Spain’s Enagas and Italy’s 
Snam comprise this conglomerate. 
Last but not least Greek State has pledged to close all 14 of the country’s 
lignite-fuelled plants by 2028, with closures starting in 2021, and replace the majority 
of them with renewable energy sources (RES). 
Consistent with the latest facts and figures, Greece has met its 2020 target. But 
it will be forced to endow the sector heavily with capital, in both RES and new energy 
infrastructure, to obtain the 2030 goals and decline its present severe reliance on coal 
and oil for power production. 
Auspiciously, a series of regulatory and legislative modifications over the last 
few years, with more anticipated, are paving the way. The Investing in Greece law, 
passed by parliament in October 2019, streamlines business licensing processes, while 
unambiguous actions to enable investments in RES will take place too. 
2. The Green Deal EU Project: Decoupling from Resources 
The European Green Deal (Table 4) provides a roadmap with actions to 
enhance the effectual use of resources by steering to a clean, greener, circular 
economy and halt climate transformation, revert biodiversity loss and truncate 
pollution. It frameworks investments that necessitate and appropriate financing tools 
accessible, while describes how to guarantee a just and complete transition.  
 
  It is EU’s commitment to confronting climate and ecosystem-related challenges 
that is this generation’s major task. The atmosphere is warming and the climate is 
shifting with each passing year. The extinction of one million out of the eight million 
species on the planet is at stake. Forests and oceans are being polluted and devastated 
every single minute. The European Green Deal is the retort to eco-system’s 
degradation. It is a new era growing strategy that targets in converting EU into a fair 
and thriving society, with a fresh, resource-efficient and competitive economy with 
zero net emissions of GhG  in 2050 and where economic prosperity is decoupled from 
natural reserves use. The principal aim of the European Green Deal is for the European 
Union to turn into the world's first “climate-neutral bloc” by year 2050. Targets extend 
too many different sectors, such as construction, industry, biodiversity, energy, 
transport and food. 
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(Table 4: The European Green Deal various elements) 
 
Strategy comprises potential carbon tariffs for countries that don't limit their (GhG) 
emissions at the same rate. It consists of: 
a. A circular economy action plan. 
b. A review and possible amendments (optionally) of the all relevant 
climate-related policy mechanisms, including the Emissions Trading System. 
c. The Farm to Fork strategy along with a focus shift from compliance to 
performance (which will incorporate a reward mechanism for farmers to handle and 
store carbon in the soil, value-added nutrient practices, sinking emissions. 
d. A revised Energy Taxation Directive which bones up on fossil fuel 
subsidies and tax exclusions (air travel, shipment). 
e. An ecological and shrewd kinesis strategy and an EU forest stratagem. 
It’s time to rehab environment’s lungs through afforestation, and plantation 
preservation and restoration in Europe. 
Unquestionably one of the most possible means of decarbonisation of the 
economy is the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism which is a powerful tool, since 
it reflects the carbon intensity of imported products with in EU, such as ores.  
It also rests on Horizon Europe, to perform a key role in uplifting national public 
and leveraging private investments. Via collaborations involving member States and 
industry, it will promote research and innovation applied on transportation 
technologies, such as batteries, low-carbon steel making, clean hydrogen, circular bio-
based sectors and the built environment The EU launches an investment plan 
(InvestEU) in order to fund the policies necessary for the Green Deal actualization, 
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which conjectured minimum amount reaches 1 trillion euros. Additionally, the set out 
goals, that derive from the Deal are estimated as much as approximately €260 billion 
per year by 2030 in investments. 
3. Greece Framed: The 10-Year Energy National Plan 
The National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) is a combination of ambitious and 
coherent energy policies that aim to conform to EU’s Energy Union goals by 2030. 
National energy transition is reliant to four basic axes, reduction of GHG emissions, 
higher penetration of RES in gross final energy consumption, improved energy 
efficiency for greater energy reserves, and lignite phase-out in power generation, to 
ensure that this drastic sector transformation drives to a climate decoupled economy 
by 2050 (Table 5). 
 
            (Table 5: National energy and environmental objectives for the period 2021-2030 in the context of EU policies.) 
  
 
In light of the above, the main objective of the NECP is to design, organize and 
adopt socially and environmentally efficient and cost-effective course of action 
measures that will serve the feasibility of medium- and long-term energy and climate 
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national objectives, will add to economic progress and also respond to the challenge of 
lowering energy expenses, by protecting both users and state financial system. 
Submitted to the EU in December 2019, this plan suggests potential 
investments adding approx. €44 billions in energy sector transformation and 
environmental schemes spread over the next decade, anticipating up to 60,000 jobs in 
return (Table 6). New aspiring aims towards 2030 have been set by the National Energy 








(Table 6: Investments according NECP towards 2030 targets completion) 
 
 
a. 35% share of RES in gross final energy consumption. 
b. 60% share of RES in gross final electricity consumption. 
c. 40% share of RES in final energy for heating and cooling. 
d. More than 14% share of RES in final energy for transport. 
e. Reduction of final energy consumption by 38% compared to the 
respective forecasts of 2007.  
f. Lessening of total GhG by at least 40% compared to 1990.  
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 The objectives above (Table 7) are intended to be reached by dint of a 
mixture of actions for energy efficiency and the all-encompassing penetration of RES 
technologies in electricity production, heat supply and transportation. A fundamental 
aspect of national strategy for the NECP is the highly aspirational, yet realistic package 
of definitive decreasing the share of lignite in power generation, the so-called “lignite 
phase-out”, by implementing an appropriate front-loaded time-plan in the following 
decade and terminating the use of lignite era in Greece by 2028. As a result, NECP 
determines the timeframe for closing down the lignite-fired plants that are still in 
operation, to be concluded by year 2023. 
 
  (Table 7: Summary of national objectives in the context of the NECP) 
 
Policy priorities were established in relation to the six dimensions of the Energy 
Union: 
a. Climate change, emissions and removals of greenhouse gases. 
b. Renewable energy sources. 
c. Improvement in energy efficiency. 
d. Energy supply security. 
e. Energy market. 
f. Research, innovation and competitiveness, expanded to new 
exploitative fields and sectors, like agriculture, shipping and tourism, comprising the 
introduction of a prioritized horizontal policies device, linking to the governance 
mechanism which is reckoned to be decisive in certifying the efficacious monitoring 
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and, in due course, implementation of the measures planned and attaining the core 
national energy and climate objectives laid down in the present NECP. 
The above qualitative objectives are divided into the following key categories: 
a. Strengthening interconnectivity and security of energy supply, towards 
speeding up the electrical interconnection of the islands and evolving strategic storage 
projects. 
b. Timetables for liberalised and competitive energy markets will speed up 
launching the new electricity market model. 
c. Scheduling for the optimum advance and functioning of the energy 
system and energy infrastructures for the benefit of users by digitising the energy 
networks, coupling the final sectors and promoting electromobility. 
d. Protecting and strengthening the role of consumers. 
e. Changing consumption patterns and using energy-efficient and low 
emission fuels in final consumption sectors via promotion of new technologies. 
f. Solidification the competitiveness of the national economy by 
developing new financial instruments. 
g. Promoting research and innovation in environmental and energy issues 
The above course of actions that derives from the NECP essentially demonstrates the 
state’s holistic approach to tackle inauspicious environmental omens by planning 
smart climate and energy policies and measures.  
4. Implications and Challenges of EU Green Deal in Greek 
Economic Future 
As it was well mentioned above, the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) 
260 is a critical stratagem that targets to reverse the poor environmental course of the 
country and put it in a greener, more prosperous and economically auspicious track. 
However the deployment of this gigantic plan has significant drawbacks, characterized 
as “critical elements” such as: 
a. The required amount το be invested just to ensure transition is 
expected to reach 260 billion per year based on the Commission’s estimates to achieve 
the  EU Green Deal, climate and energy related targets and ending point the year 2030. 
b. The appendix to the EU Green Deal includes 50 actions to be in force in 
almost 24 months (2019- 2021) by means of regulations or directives correlated to 
climate, energy, circular economy, transportation, agriculture, financial services, 
biodiversity and waste management. Also includes clauses for updating current 
relevant legislations. 
Mainly, on account of the above The EU Green Deal might face grim 
implications in virtually every sector of the Greek economy.  
Power and Utility companies experience key challenges following the arrow of 
decarbonisation, and comprise sharply to the net-zero targets. Energy transition to a 
greener mix is key to this, providing ample space to the usage of RES or natural gas as 
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an interim fuel. As seen in the previous chapter, decarbonisation strategy is part of the 
EU Green Deal action plan and hence assimilated in the Hellenic NECP. 
Conversely, transition to net zero via lignite phase out means substantial socio-
economic impacts for local communities, where lignite units and coal mines operate. 
The challenge here is the suggested EU Just Transition Mechanism, National Plans and 
other funding sources to bring positive results and relief the decoupled economy 
participants. 
Furthermore, transition to Circular Economy may force many companies in the 
sector to implements modifications to existing operating model to confront rapid 
changes and requirements. Examples of such modifications are: 
a. Imposing a regulatory minimum percentage of recycled materials re-
entering the manufacturing line. 
b. Provisions on manufacturing products prone to recycling with minimum 
reparability specifications providing further lifetime. 
c. Evolution of economic instruments (environmental taxation, green tax 
reforms and improved waste management).  
 In the Constructions sector, energy performance related buildings legislations 
become more ambitious and will be supplemented by partial funding and incentives to 
upgrade their energy efficiency profile. A wind of renovation will blow over public and 
private buildings bringing energy bills drops (that also can reduce poverty). Engaged to 
that scope EU and the Member States will have to boost the construction sector and 
especially SMEs and local jobs accordingly. Indispensable strategies to implement and 
promote sustainable development will be intensively demanded for innovative 
investments and landmark projects. 
Moreover, concerning the Transportation sector, use of clean energy vehicles, 
electrification of railways, austere fuel consumption emissions monitoring and 
reporting requirements for shipping and aviation set the standards of time versus 
effort and money very high. Apropos marine transportation, IMO 2050 GHG emissions 
reduction targets incorporated to NECP and Green Deal objectives, challenge the 
Greek ship owners to invest in alternative fuels and acquire sustainable fleets. 
In relation to National Economy, Sustainable Finance Regulation shall benefit 
eco-friendly investments and projects, through funding provided by Greek and 
international financial institutions, funds and private equity investors. Financial 
institutions’ credit rating is challenged to incorporate ESG (Environmental, Social, 
Governance) factors, thus shifting financing into environmental friendly sectors and 
activities. 
Last but not least, Tourism, though it’s not currently governed by Green Deal or 
NECP provisions, it is a sector which is expected to be vastly affected. Country’s 
geographical location and natural wealth raises prospects for sustainable tourism 
expansion. Vital targets to reach that state would be: 
a. The fortification of natural environment, waste management, and 
cultural resources. 
b. The support of the welfare of the local communities. 
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c. The organization and rearrangement of tourism-related transport 
(mainly air and sea) in order to minimize its environmental footprint. 
d. The enhancing and cultural promotion of green tourism infrastructure, 
via financing and application of circular economy. 
e. Optimizing the tourism-oriented jobs features, such as fixity, welfare, 
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Β. GAS AS AN ASSET OR A SECURITY HARNESS FOR GREECE 
1. Natural Gas: The “Passage” to Decarbonisation 
 
If Greece wants to reap the harvest of this huge effort described above, then it 
must make use of all its available tools. Considered by far the cleanest fossil fuel, 
Natural gas, can play its part in this transition route. The role of gas as a passage from 
intensive energy to decarbonisation has been promoted for a long  time, especially 
that of fuel switching primarily from coal. 
Back in 1986, when it first entered the Greek market, gas was considered as 
energy means that would not only release the country from the oil dependency but 
also re-establish it in the European Energy Map. In spite of the fact that natural gas 
would help also to reach the evolving and rigorous, towards a greener future, EU 
environmental credentials,  its penetration (no more than 0,2% as of 1996) was scarce. 
It was only a few years after in 2000, and the commissioning of the first LNG terminal 
in Revythoussa, backed by some faint efforts of market liberalization, that gas gained 
some ground, yet it stroke on the decennial economic crisis that crystallized any 
further effort for expansion or evolution whatsoever. 




(Table 8: Primary Energy Consumption by Fuel Source in Greece, 1965-2018) 
 
natural gas, after country’s successful exit from the final bailout program in 2018 
attempts to play the centerpiece of Greece’s energy revived role. Privatisation of state-
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owned distribution network undertaken by three major European natural gas 
transmission companies, along with positive and prosperous climate developed among 
investors followed the “Memorandums Regime Days” termination, led European 
Investment Bank (EIB) to finance the construction of a - first-of-its kind in the broader 
Eastern Mediterranean region -new LNG bunkering vessel in Greece, creating the 
conditions to turn the country into a regional hub. 
 Time is also an ally in this juncture as gas prices under the pressure of us shale 
gas neo-reserves head downwards and taking into account the geographical and 
geopolitical position of the country, this global abundance and affordability combined 
with the determining factor of vicinity to existing and potential infrastructures and 
resources, given that a great share of gas price is transportation charges, sets Greece’s 




(Table 9: Natural Gas Supplies by Origin in Greece, MSc Panos Mavroeidis - ENI Trading & Shipping) 
 
One can argue, judging from the present and projected gas flows as depicted in 
the above Table 9, that as potential supplies tend to 19 bcm per annum over the next 
few years, the country will sharpen its penetration into gas markets, capable to 
overlap demand by factor of more than 3. This projected throughput, in turn, would 
favor price competition domestically, leading to wider distribution of natural gas in the 
country. 
The quickest win, concerning CO2 emissions, is the lignite-to-gas switching fuel 
usage. Indeed, lignite (coal) the backbone of Greece’s energy production and heating 
element for decades and a plentiful natural resource, as we analyzed in previous 
chapters, is outdated and contractually terminating its usage. IEA suggests, an average, 
coal-to-gas switching reduces emissions by 50% when producing electricity and by 33% 
when providing heat, thus interpreted in emissions savings of about 10% in today’s 
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power and heat sectors in Greece. By switching from lignite to existing gas-fired plants, 
there is a prospective to 4% reduction of country’s total emissions. As of today, after a 
fall of 4,5 TWh in 2019, still 10 TWh of lignite power generation shall be eliminated by 




(Table 10: Electricity Generation by Fuel Source, 2019. Source: Entso-e, 2019) 
 
In an environment of higher CO2 emissions prices, as the one in EU the 
following years, significant financial burdens will be set and therefore prices will push 
lignite usage to the exit and plants to decommissioning. In the medium term, neither 
renewables nor heavier fossil fuels can respond to the call for decarbonization. Fast 
track to lower emissions need a stable transition vessel capable to withstand volatile 
RES irregularities and instability, while exiling coal, oil and securing the energy supply 
of the country. By the same token, gas can potentially become a strategic asset, that’ll 
lead country to prosperous and securer horizons. 
2. The Neo-Reserves and Their Potentials 
The last decade and during the financial crisis years, the resurgence of the ever 
topical idea of recovering the somewhere-in-Greek-seas laid beneath fossil resources 
came to the fore again. Pushed by the EU imposed modern sustainability trends and 
policy, for the sake of a serious hunting of hydrocarbons, the Greek State founded 
Hellenic Hydrocarbon Resources Management S.A. (HHRM S.A.), a private sector but 
state-owned company that immediately launched exploration and production 
concessions, and active promotion of Greece as an attractive oil and gas destination to 
international investors. Since natural gas is considered and proved above to be the 
irrefutable transition hydrocarbon, we will mostly refer to gas hereafter. 
 





(Table 11: Beyond the search for hydrocarbons in Greece, HHRM, London 2019) 
 
A few years earlier, in March 2010 the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), using a 
geology-based valuation method, projected that the entire Levantine basin—
geological formation surrounding the offshore segments of Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria 
and Cyprus— could hold as much as 3.4 bcm of recoverable natural gas and 1.7 billion 
barrels of oil (USGS 2010).The USGS also estimated that the total acreage, including its 
present and anticipated oil and gas reserves(the Aegean Sea, for example), could 
capture more than 340K bcf of gas –more than the U.S. confirmed reserve, which is the 
fourth major in the world after Russia, Iran and Qatar (USGS 2010; BP Statistical 
Review of World Energy 2018, 27-28). 
In Greece, though the licensed blocs are placed on the western and south-
western regions (onshore and offshore - Table 11), due to their basic delimitation 
agreements, that thoroughly and officially established recently (with Italy completed 
and with Albania under re-negotiation overview), three areas keep serious energy 
interest, which demonstrably possess large volumes of gas. These are the Ionian sea, 
the wider off-shore areas south of the island of Crete, and the Herodotus Basin. 
Uncommonly in such cases, the scientific studies here agree on the existence of 
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extensive neo-reserves of natural gas south of Crete and the Herodotus Basin as well 
as of oil reserves along the Ionian. 
 
 
(Table 12: The Greek ‘blocks’, as appear in the second licensing round for gas exploration, in 2014. Source: Greek Ministry of 
Environment, Energy and Climate Change) 
 
(Table 13: The Greek ‘blocks’ and reserves underneath, source HHRM, London 2019) 
 
Hence, in consonance with the US Geopolitical Survey, it is appraised that there 
are ample volumes of natural gas 70km south of the Mesara Bay in Crete, which it is 
claimed that Greek block no 14 between the areas of Plakias and Frangokastello has 
1,5 trillion m3 of natural gas (Tables 12-13). Equally, a Greek study assesses the over-all 
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volume of natural gas in the same area to approximately 3,5 trillion m3, assigning it 
with the Mexico Bay, the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. 
With respect to the pecuniary value of the off-shore neo-reserves and the net 
profits of Greece from the aforementioned area, Deutsche Bank has estimated it to 
approximately €427 bn, while the profit for the Greek State approaches €214 bn. An 
analogous cost-effective study raises the Greek Public profit to €599 bn, over a period 
of 25 years, from the inauguration of the exploitation. Apropos the marine acreage of 
the Greek north-western part of the Herodotus Basin, as stated by the French Beicip-
Franlab, it is projected that it might come to 2.5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, 
while, the American Geological Review gives a 50% prospect there are 3 trillion cubic 




(Table 14: TAP, Turkish-Stream, and the potential extension of the later, upgrade Greece’s 
traditional geopolitical value. Source: Institute of Energy for South-East Europe) 
 
In conclusion, Greece as illustrated in the previous chapters, being a transition 
grid host country, upholds a robust geographical advantage, as a core transit country 
for the regional pipeline and route (LNG) planning. Greece is part of TAP, Turk-Stream 
(the former South-Stream), as well as the, particularly remarkable, Vertical Corridor, 
which vertically links Balkan and Eastern European States, from the Aegean to the 
Baltic, detouring Ukraine. Lastly, Greece has signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
with Russia, Serbia, Hungary and North Macedonia for the expansion of Turk-Stream 
towards Austria (Tables 14-15). 
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(Table 15: The Vertical Corridor connects vertically the Balkan and Eastern Europe states, from 
Aegean towards Baltic, can by-pass Ukraine. Source: Institute of Energy for South-East Europe) 
3. The Way to Autonomy 
A vista of a new gas export hub starting up in the Eastern Mediterranean is 
particularly attractive for Europe, which, as explained above, is concerned about 
diminishing production in the North Sea and its increasing dependence on Russia. The 
neoreserves could provide supplementary energy supply for the energy-suffocated 
European markets and increase the diversification prospects for countries dependent 
on a single supplier (EU Commission, 2017). 
At present, the Eastern Mediterranean is a noteworthy route for the EU’s 
natural gas and oil imports, as approximately 35% of its natural gas and 50% of its oil 
consumption are traded through the area (Szoke 2016). 
Undoubtedly with all these potential energy reserves discovered and a deep 
prospect for further explorations, Greece has a strong potential to gallop towards 
development and prosperity. This concentrated wealth that lies beneath the seabed of  
Eastern Mediterranean, carries much anticipation for country’s aim to become 
a more independent and self-reliant state the forthcoming years. With many projects 
to realize in a tight defined by the EU policies framework, a renewed air of positivity is 
sweeping across the country.  
 Neither the projected anticipated growth rates of the economy (+4.1% for 
2021), nor the positive ratings from international agencies (Moody’s upgrade, 
11/2020) are able to explain the positivity alone, notwithstanding the fact that all 
those energy mega-plans are yet to yield outcomes. The fact that recent discoveries of 
large gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean mean that Greece could soon serve as 
an energy hub between European markets and regional producers, is the dragging 
force that fuels Greek aspires of brighter economic scenery. 
 Monetization of these unspoiled assets is a challenge to the country, but also a 
way to its multi-dimensional autonomy. Financially, demographically, culturally, 
defensively, autonomous State means, that the offshore unexploited resources are 
destined to enhance not only state’s energy security, but to upgrade and re-establish 
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all current socio-economic-political interrelations that Greece maintains inter-alia with 
its partners in and out of EU.  
Further to the above, country’s hard power and diplomacy is not an average of 
its size. Greece is in events and affairs that take place currently in its neighbourhood 
silently present. This increased involvement does not come from nowhere. The end of 
the Yugoslav wars and its fragmentation in the late 1990s has turned Greek interest 
towards the Mediterranean. From the Greek point of view, with rich marine and 
nautical heritage, the Mediterranean is a source of threats and challenges.   
On account of its geographical propinquity, country cannot afford to pay no 
attention to developments in the Middle East and North Africa. Owing to its location, 
Greece could easily deploy military action for joint security energies in the region. It is 
one of the few NATO countries that defence expenditures are well above than 2% of 
its GDP. The Hellenic Armed Forces are distinctive of excellency in numerous NATO 
missions and the country possesses military infrastructures that are vital to Western 
security. 
In this milieu, Athens is building a new geopolitical identity as a rampart of the 
West in the Eastern Mediterranean, thus interpreting its new tasks within the 
framework of NATO/European development for regional security issues. Consequently, 
Greece can turn into not only a successful energy security example, but also to a 





















C. TURMOIL IN S/E MED: GREEK FOREIGN POLICY, ALLIANCES AND 
ANTAGONISTIC CHALLENGES 
1. Energy Security Amalgamates New Energy Alliances in the Geopolitics 
Furnace 
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 The location of gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean has been seen with 
keen response as a result of their prospective impact on the economic, geopolitical 
and political equilibriums in the region. It is generally recognized that the new reserves 
could have a major, positive effect on Europe’s gas-diversification approach, 
empowering EU Member States to manage a long pursued goal, to considerably 
reduce their dependency on Russian gas. In early 2019, Greek, Egyptian, Cypriot, 
Israeli, Jordanian, Italian and PA Energy Ministers, had a summit in Cairo where they 
assessed the establishment the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), an 
instrument meant to serve as the aegis for collaboration and dialogue concerning the 
development of gas resources in the region. Energy maybe the basis for the forum, 
however broader geostrategic progressions were those that led to its formation, and 
they mirror the regional states’ common perceptions vis-à-vis the significance of the 
Eastern Mediterranean to their national security (Winter and Lindenstrauss 2019).  
With this move, the actors of the region bare their political willpower to 
transmute the issue of gas reserves into further not-exclusively- commercial 
“strategic” coalitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, this political drive may 
emanate serious geopolitical and economic tragedies. It is argued that these (positive) 
perceptions originat 
e from politically driven rather than fact-based assessments, and that they 
overlook firm geo-economic veracities. 
Gas exploration rally in the Eastern Mediterranean has started unfolding in 
2009, when a group headed by U.S.-based Noble Energy discovered huge gas reserves 
in the Tamar field off Israel’s coast, transmuting Israel’s economy and international 
status overnight. Oil & Gas Journal valued Israel’s proven oil reserves at 11.5 million 
barrels, in 2014 whereas, Netherland, Sewell & Associates, Inc., estimated the volume 
of natural gas in the Tamar field at 11.2 trillion cubic feet in 2017, with an additional 
14.6 million barrels of condensate (an ultra-light mixture of hydrocarbon liquids-
Graeber 2017). 
Two years later, Noble Energy announced the discovery of the Aphrodite gas 
field in Cyprus’s southern Exclusive Economic Zone, with a rather small natural gas 
find-projection of 4.5 trillion cubic feet (140 bcm) (Oikonomopoulos and Stambolis 
2012; Tagliapetra 2013). Fuelled by those auspicious findings Cypriot authorities have 
granted licenses to other energy companies, rushed into the region eager to profit 
from the impending gas bonanza. Thus, all of Cyprus’s 13 offshore blocks in its EEZ 
have been allotted to gas corporations from Italy, the Netherlands, France, United 
States and Israel, all of which have made major investments grounded on the promise 
of obtainable resources beneath the water. After a fruitfully completed international 
bidding in December 2016, Cyprus awarded the rights to reconnoitre Blocks 6, 8, and 
10 to four international firms: Eni, Total, ExxonMobil and Qatar Petroleum 
International, respectively. Eni finally in early 2018 announced the discovery of a gas-
bearing concavity in the Calypso 1 well it had drilled in Block 6. The favourable reserve 
lies just to the north of the maritime border with Egypt, within the Egyptian EEZ, where 
in 2015 the same company had discovered a giant gas field. Calypso is expected to 
contain somewhere between 6 to 8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (Republic of Cyprus 
2018). 
Taking into account that neither Cyprus nor Israel has a large enough domestic 
gas market to facilitate the growth of gas fields, and that they both count on export 
markets, the monetisation of their gas has become a cumbersome issue: the present 
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energy resources require several billion dollars of new money in contracts to be 
commercialized. Israel and Cyprus have no pipelines to large consumers, nor the 
infrastructure to liquefy gas in order to export it by ship (Thrassou et al. 2016, 115-
141). As these gas fields are sited in juxtaposition, collaboration on their monetisation 
is virtually obligatory and, in fact, several monetisation alternatives have already been 
considered for delivering gas from the Israeli and Cypriot gas fields to developed 
European markets. 
Natural gas is an inherently mutable solution of gases that through its 
circulation undergoes a string of vivid variations. While it can become denser or less 
dense, depending on the local or the time it again can expand or contract. It responds 
lively to temperature fluctuations and varies its state from gas to liquid and vice versa. 
Hence, pipeline transportation is preferable when it comes to short-medium long 
distances, explaining why most natural gas markets are regional. LNG affords trading 
over much longer distances (Table 16). For pipelines, operating costs are relatively low 
as compared to capital costs. The more expensive the infrastructure, the larger the 
initial contracts must be to cover costs; as a result, solid and long term business-to-
business, business-to-government and government-to-government contracts and 




        (Table 16: Alternatives to Natural Gas transportation in terms of cost, researchgate.com) 
 
2. Greece’s Foreign Policy Susceptibility to Policy Makers Beliefs  
Greece is a relatively small state with a deep understanding of its political 
weight limitations by its leaders, compelled to act as a regional and not international 
actor. For a serious of years its Foreign Policy quiescence and inactivity was static, in 
such a degree that served solely the purpose of balancing relations with the Arab 
World (Voskopoulos, 2017, 148). Introverted and passive was the mentality of the 
Greek decision-makers officials, that has driven to limited initiatives, ignoring of 
advantageous opportunities for multilateral initiatives and formatting tactical or 
strategic coalitions in the Eastern Mediterranean, narrowing its string of positive 
developments only to the approach and ties cultivation with Israel, for a more visible 
energy footprint in the regional map (Dokos 2016, 37-38). 
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Undoubtedly, the order in our neighbourhood has dramatically change the 
concurrent years, following the vacuum of power that had been followed by the US 
withdrawal from the region, the substantial shift in rhetoric and policy of peripheral 
actors, historical revolutions and socio-religious groundswells like the uprising of Arab 
Spring  and of course the discovery of the fossil resources. Hence Greece is obliged to 
transmit influence towards East Mediterranean, Middle East and Balkans 
consecutively. 
Even more, the Crisis Years (2010-18), that enormous austerity along with fiscal 
and moral wave shocks hit the country, skyrocketing the unemployment and raised the 
abjuration of political stage, the parties and their representatives, the foreign policy 
practicing became poorer and initiatives were mainly seen as neglected elements and 
“best avoided” as anything that hadn’t had to do directly with money and fiscal 
matters that time. 
The above ground was commented just to illustrate how important factor is for 
the standards of Greek Politics the decision makers instead of the decision 
construction mechanisms that are founded in solid systematic institutions systems. 
Truly throughout all 200 years of modern Greek state this political concept has been 
soaking all aspects of political exertion. Decision makers’ personal beliefs are much 
more important as the process of foreign policymaking reveals the underlying 
significance of personalities in the absence of efficient and systematic institutions 
(Ioakimidis 1999, 165). As poliheuristic theory suggests, a two-stage decision process 
where in heuristic shortcuts are implemented in the first stage in an effort to reduce 
complexity, and a rational maximizing strategy is applied in the second stage on the 
remaining alternatives in the choice set (Mintz 2004, 3-4).  
As a result, decision-makers’ convictions are the important factor in 
understanding, identifying, and decreeing the decision-making method of states, 
mostly in situations of high ambiguity. Beliefs deriving from a specific operating milieu 
are expected to affect foreign policy experts. As research suggests, they tend to use 
their former knowledge and experience to decrease complexity and decode unknown 
reality.  
Beliefs of Greek decision-makers are of utmost importance in the development 
of Greek foreign policy vis-à-vis the Eastern Mediterranean top-list matters. These 
beliefs that State’s foreign policy seems to continue to be based showcase three main 
dimensions: 
a.  A general view that Greece’s foreign policy had better be active, not 
passive, especially bearing in mind its location in key geopolitical region thus taking as 
much initiative as possible and not stay immobile. It should attempt to resolve 
problems more willingly than overlooking them.  
For example from the previous decade it formed partnerships with Cyprus, 
Israel and Egypt, but has also introduced other regional associations with such 
countries as the Palestine Authority, Lebanon and Jordan and a novel one is under 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ consideration, lately with Bahrain. Furthermore, it has 
established a number of multilateral forums, based on those geo-economic rather than 
geostrategic alliances. 
b. The second dimension is of a geopolitical nature. Greece is at the heart of a 
cross of instability, with Ukraine to the north, North Macedonia, Bulgaria and Kosovo 
to the north-west Turkey and its neighbouring countries – Iraq, Syria and Lebanon–to 
the east, and failed states, such as Libya, to the south. This unstable surrounding has 
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led country to reinforce regional security. Greece traditionally not only from 
geographical but also from cultural viewpoint, was the bridge between Europe and the 
Middle East, mediating and conciliate simultaneously the several social, political, and 
economic disorders across the region. Therefore the claim often expressed by previous 
generation Greek politicians that post Cold-War Era declined importance of Greece as 
a geopolitical actor has collapsed and revised to a state being an ‘exporter of stability’ 
nowadays, considering the dominant interrelations. 
c. The third and maybe most currently important dimension is geo-economic, 
and is based on energy security. As we argued above, Greek decision makers believe 
that country could become a regional energy hub with gross geo-economic potential. 
On the one hand, this view showcases the unprecedented struggle for a least geo-
economic cooperation, and gas resources provide the best incentive to that end. But 
on the other hand, here’s the antilog: if the engaged countries expound policies that 
are indifferent to regional realities then, that can easily cause ignition particularly if the 
predominant geopolitical and economic circumstances locally, regionally and globally 
are hostile to such a setting.  
3. The Trilateral Partnerships 
Athens and Jerusalem in late-2000s, have come closer on the diplomatic, 
political, military and economic arenas. The pursuit, of the cherished strategic depth 
towards the Mediterranean by Israel and a productive deterrent regional coalition 
against Ankara, targeting to the sufficient protection of Nicosia’s legitimate rights in 
extracting resources from its Exclusive Economic Zone, (EEZ), have inevitably promoted 
the convergence of the above states’ regional interests, of the geopolitical sub-system 
of the South-Eastern Mediterranean. 
A core motive behind the tack changing of Athens and Nicosia by Jerusalem has 
been the progressive alienation in-between Turkey and Israel, resulting in the decisive 
break in their relations, in late 2000s. Undeniably, the strategic coalition between 
Turkey and Israel, which lasted no less than, ten successive years and provided the 
latter  with the indispensable strategic-operational depth, began to deteriorate with 
Ankara’s attempts to energize its neo-Ottoman doctrine , which has in store the 
paramountcy in the region for Turkey, beginning from the closest Middle East. 
Synchronously, Greece and Cyprus were experiencing the challenge game of a 
revisionist Turkish policy throughout Mediterranean semicircle from Thrace and the 
north Aegean to the south east Mediterranean, right in the Cypriot EEZ. Given the 
objective convergence of interests of the three states, Greece and Cyprus chose to 
build-up a trilateral/tripartite strategic alliance with Israel, engaging by a new modus 
operandi an operationally powerful actor in the south-eastern Mediterranean region 
and gaining its support, Israel.  
However, the geopolitical-geoeconomical factor of energy is the one that 
promises the smooth co-operative and allied dynamic of the three states in the long 
term. The recently revealed reserves in the adjacent EEZs of the three states presage 
the reversal of the area to a global energy strategic spot. The declared strategic 
alliance of Greece-Cyprus-Israel is an undeniable fact. Generally, this is apprehended in 
all areas of activity of a sovereign state, with common springboard the political, 
diplomatic, economic and military association of the three states.  
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The above historic conjuncture has been enhanced due to the large 
hydrocarbon reserves (Tamar, Aphrodite, Leviathan, Fig.2) - as described in the 
previous chapter - that have been disclosed after the systematic exploration of their 
common EEZ. Consecutively, initiation of the political efforts of three states to build 
the strategic alliance, didn’t take long, and inaugurated on 8 August of 2013, in Nicosia, 
where a Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding to confirm “...their volition for the 
promotion of their in-between economic relations and the reinforcement of the 
collaboration in the area of energy” was signed between the Ministers of Energy of 
Cyprus, Greece and Israel.  
 
 
                    
                               (Figure 2: Israel and Cyprus off-shore natural-gas fields) 
 
 
Till the discovery of the Leviathan, Tamar and Dalit neo-reserves, the Israeli 
deposits were in total 1, 7 trillion m3, from the well-known off-shore natural gas fields 
of Mari and Noa. In relation to the most recent estimations, the neo-reserves of 
natural gas in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Israel amount much higher. More 
specifically: 
a. Tamar: 90km from Haifa and in depth of 1.680m. Recoverable reserves 307 
km3 
b. Dalit: 13km east of Tamar: Recoverable reserves: 14 km3 
c. Leviathan: 130km west of Haifa and in depth of 1.635m. Recoverable 
Reserves: 620 km3.  
Israel began extracting from the gas field Tamar, back in 2009, while Leviathan 
yielded production the last day of 2019. Finally, it is estimated that the 
aforementioned volumes of natural gas can cover Israel’s energy needs for the next 3 
to 4 decades, while large quantities are to be exported. 
Potential acreages of neo-reserves within the Cypriot EEZ are blocks 12 and 9 
(Fig.3) which are the first ones explored and have been conceded to international 
consortia for operation. Noble Energy and Delek commenced business on Block 12 and 
the Aphrodite gas field. The latter is located within Block 12, 34km west of the Israeli 
“Leviathan” field, which is also operated by the same consortium. Block 9 and the 
underlying gas fields “Onasagoras” and “Amathus” is operated by the Italo-Korean 
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Consortium Eni-Kogas. Israeli companies Delek and Avner, estimate that the natural 
gas quantities in ‘Aphrodite’ gas field exceed 140 km3. Calypso gas field in block 6 was 
found in 2018, and it is estimated that holds 170 to 230 km3 as well. 
 
 
(Figure 3: The neo-reserves in the EEZ of Cyprus are divided in 13 so-called “blocks”. The energy companies, Noble Energy and 
Delek are the operators of Block 12 and its Aphrodite natural gas field.(Source: Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and   
Tourism of the Republicof Cyprus) 
 
“Zohr” natural gas field, is the gigantic Egyptian offshore gas field  located in 
the Egyptian zone (claimable EEZ) of the Mediterranean Sea. The field is located in the 
Shorouk concession, a concession with an area of 3,765 square kilometres 
(1,454 sq mi) which was won by Eni in 2013. Its quantities can cover Egyptian needs 
form more than ten years. A great point to illustrate is that that Zohr gas field attaches 
block 11 of the Cypriot EEZ, only 6 km away. Thus French company Total, holder of 
exploitation rights for the Cypriot block 11, shall elaborate the research and specify 
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        (Figure 3: The Egyptian neo-reserve natural gas-field Zohr) 
 
From the Greek viewpoint, the East Mediterranean Alliance initiative is vital. 
Greece’s sovereign debt crisis and its insolvency in 2010 set its relationship with the 
northern EU members under austere strain. At the present time, Athens faces the 
revolting spectrum of longstanding foreign economic “monitoring” and weighty 
limitations placed upon its fiscals policies. Since current and future Greek 
administrations must function while in the provisions of EU “monitoring,” Athens 
pursues to promote alternative bilateral and multilateral initiatives separate from the 
constricted Brussels-dominated radius – and the above alignment fits this bill 
seamlessly.  
In an analogous movement Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, held a tripartite summit 
in Cairo on 8 November 2014, where the leaders of the three countries tackled the 
ongoing issues in Middle East as well as the East Mediterranean Sea. That was the 
beginning of another tripartite alignment, that already has been honoured by eight 
summits, where the three heads of governments joined forces to intensify the 
cooperation in sectors such as economy, tourism, culture and of course energy and 
security. Definition of common maritime borders was of course a central topic in the 
agenda as well as EEZ in the Eastern Mediterranean. Heretofore, sectorial cooperation 
has seen much progress, among others, in sectors such as tourism, environment, 
cultural heritage preservation and protection, research and innovation, education, 
diaspora support and of course energy security, investments and defence and security.  
A notable clause for cooperation so as to protect vital infrastructures, in the 
hot-spots of the gas-fields in the south east Mediterranean, is also encompassed in the 
Document. In 2015, Israel and Greece co-signed a “status of forces” agreement that 
render legal defence to both militaries while training in each other’s countries. A 
corresponding memorandum has also been signed by Greek and Egyptian 
governments. 
Furthermore the Egyptian Armed Forces have participated, co-planned and 
launch important tactical and operational tasks (Medusa-10) along with Greek Armed 
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Forces, thus enhancing the stability and security in the region. Truthfully, in the 
military-operational field, several common aeronautical, naval and military operations 
have taken place in the Aegean Sea, the island of Crete, Cyprus, Egypt, in mainland 
Greece and the coast and deserts of Israel. Recently, a big contract between Israel and 
Hellenic Air Forces signed for permanent joint air training courses for the new Greek 
pilots.  
Even so, the energy geopolitical factor is the qualitative dynamic catalyst in this 
tripartite allied relationship and the energy security the desideratum out of this 
alignment. Unquestionably, the destiny that shapes this alliance has been greatly 
determined by geography, since their contiguous EEZs, contain large volumes of 
confirmed energy mixture, (Israel, Cyprus) that have been, or expected to be, (Greece), 
discovered. 
Energy developments in the Eastern Mediterranean are of course 
strengthening the trilateral partnership. Companies are the first to substantially 
benefit. In December 2017, Israel Chemicals (ICL Group) signed a contract with the 
Greek Energean company for the latter to supply up to 13 BCM of natural gas to the 
former at a $1.9 billion over a period of 15 years. For this purpose, governments of 
Greece, Israel, and Cyprus are regularly convening trilateral summits for the purpose of 
finding areas of cooperation around earlier and future natural gas findings in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. 
Another big project aftereffect of the alliance,is the EuroAsia Interconnector 
(Fig.4), a planned cable system to connect the electricity grids of Cyprus, Israel, and 
Greece to the European transmission network, destined to be the world’s lengthiest 
undersea power cable. It is a key “Project of Common Interest of the European Union” 
and a priority Electricity Highway Interconnector Project, bridging Asia and Europe. 
Regulatory approval of electricity interconnection was completed on October 10, 2017. 
Being a historic decision for Cyprus, sets an ultimate term in  electricity isolation of the 
last non-interconnected EU member state.  
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(Figure 4: The EuroAsia Interconnector, Source:EU) 
 
EuroAfrica another electrification mega-project, will comprise an 
interconnector between the power systems of Egypt, Greece and Cyprus, built on the 
respect and aegis of their trilateral cooperation and aiming to boost the security of 
energy supply, not only of the aforementioned countries but also of Europe, as it will 
generate a thoroughfare for the transmission of momentous amounts of electricity 




(Figure 5: The EuroAfrica Interconnector, Source:EU) 
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It constitutes a vital element of the strategy to hasten the progress of the 
Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor as a new alternative source of energy supplies 
from the region to the European Continent and vice versa. 
The concurrence of discovery, extraction and exploitation of Israeli and Egypt 
neo-reserves with those of Cyprus, followed by Greek efforts to technically measure 
and quantify its own, gets together, by definition, the four countries’ interests for 
regional stability and growth. The considerable expenditure of resources required from 
Greece and Cyprus in order to safeguard their national sovereignty in a widespread 
zone and the lack of a unwavering regional ally for Israel, provide the held hook-up, 
features of Grand National Strategy. 
 
1. The East Med Project: An Energy Stratagem 
 
 
(Figure 6: The Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline, (East-Med).(Source: Ioannis Th. Mazis and 
Georgios Sgouros, Regional Science Inquiry Journal, Vol. II (2), 2010, pp. 133-150)) 
 
The backbone of the previous analysed long term alliance between Israel, 
Greece and Cyprus providing the anticipated added value is the construction of the 
East Mediterranean Pipeline. The pipeline is of the utmost strategic significance; 
aiming to transport and distribute the Israeli, Cypriot and Greek natural gas reserves.  
DEPA, the Greek Public Natural Gas Company, initially proposed feasibility of the 
EastMed, back in 2012. With a length of approximately 1,900 km, depths of 3km, and a 
capacity of around 10 billion cubic meters per year, the construction of the pipeline is 
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projected to finish around 2027 and the cost will reach €6 billion (US$6.86 billion). IGI 
Poseidon S.A., a 50-50% joint venture between the Italian gas utility Edison and the 
Greek gas utility DEPA have commenced the pipeline development. Its capacity of 
10bcm3-an estimation excluding the Greek neo-deposits inputs - fulfils European 
Union’s Green Deal agenda of multiple suppliers so as to accomplish a grander degree 
of energy security. 
 Crossing exclusively European ground and sovereign space, connects Israel, 
Cyprus, Greece, and ends mounting to the Greek-Italian interconnector, (IGI), pipeline, 
that traverses the Adriatic Sea. In combination with the manufacture of the off-shore 
pipeline, a terminal station is premeditated in Vasiliko/Cyprus (where a FSRU terminal 
is being constructed), empowered to liquefy natural gas preceding its transfer to the 
European markets.  
In January 2019, seven peripheral energy ministers confined a deal to found the 
East Mediterranean Gas Forum. Significant exploration and production agreements 
have been signed among Exxon, Total S.A., Eni and Novatek and the relevant 
governments. 
Turkey is referred to as being the exception to regional serenity. The state members of 
the group are: Egypt, Cyprus, Israel, and Greece. Delegates from Palestine and Jordan 
have joined the meetings of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum. In January 2020, 
France and the United States joined the Forum, as a member and permanent observer 
respectively. EastMed, pigeonholed as a Project of Common Interest (Fig.7) by 
European Commission the April of the same year, whereas EU commission bankrolled 
the pipeline, with €34.5 million (US$38.9 million) to aid progress and completion of 
technical studies for the venture. 
East-Med is a monumental energy project of colossal geopolitical value. In fact, 
with the necessary backing from the EU policy framework and oriented supervision in 
the energy sector, Greece-Cyprus-Israel will be in a position to format an enduring 
long-lasting  alliance, to substitute in time the majority of EU’s, virtually monopolistic, 
suppliers of energy mixture. For each co-partner independently, this formation 
embodies specific political meaning. Israel might possibly try to directly capitalize on 
the power outcome of exporting energy to the E.U., targeting towards the 
repositioning of assured European institutions, lobbies and powers, in support of 
Israeli rhetoric, in respect to the Arab-Israeli differences.  
Undeniably, Greece and Cyprus will excruciatingly participate in the rallying to 
exploit the doles out of their energy sector in order to exit permanently the economic 
uncertainty they are experiencing. Sooner or later, the systemic geopolitical outcome 
of the tripartite alliance, which is geometrically heightened by the geopolitical factor of 
energy, is the direct promotion of the geopolitical status of the allies on a regional 
level, in the sub system of the southeast Mediterranean, under the aegis of both USA 
and EU (Mazis, 18).  
EastMed will proliferate EU’s energy security, with its more than 3,5 trillion m3 
of natural gas, and 1,7 billion barrels of oil approximations pumped directly from the 
Levantine Basin. The size of the new discoveries, if any, will also encourage the EU to 
try and participate with a bigger role in future developments of the region. 
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(Figure 7: The Projects of Common Interest, (PCIs) in Europe) 
 
 
US also support the project and the prospects for deeper cooperation and a larger 
expansion of the participants list is in store, considering the instability transmissions 
from Ankara. Broader discoveries of natural gas in the region will help the maturing of 
the plans for accelerating the preparation and starting construction of the pipe and 
vice versa. Ii is definitely an ambitious project and expensive one, but it materializes 
the determination of Eastern Mediterranean countries to step forward and unite 
against anachronistic hostile revisionism while opening gates to friendlier, more 
progressive and more democratic energy markets and societies.  
 
E. ANTAGONISTIC CHALLENGES AND THE AEGEAN DISPUTE 
Tensions have been rising lately in the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, 
where Turkey is intensifying antagonism over energy reserves by following a hostile 
gas exploration dynamics. Granting control over the islands in the Aegean Sea and the 
Mediterranean Sea has always been a point of contention between Greece and Turkey 
for almost half a century. Further to the argument regarding Turkey’s cast doubts on 
sovereignty over some of the Greek islands, there is also major divergence vis-à-vis the 
demarcation of their maritime borders. Ankara denies signing of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), claiming that an unbiased demarcation of 
the maritime borders in the Mediterranean Sea should provide more weight to 
  -40- 
Turkey’s long shoreline (Turkey has 7,200 km of shoreline while Greece has almost the 
double 13,700km) than to the dotted Greek islands, and that it is sometimes essential 
to disdain their existence.  
This issue has become ever more electric in recent years, after signing of the 
November 2019 agreement with the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya. 
This covenant arranges maritime border between the two countries according to the 
Turkish extrapolated position (in expense of any sensible, rational and legal grounded 
notion of sovereignty), in contradiction of the self-evident Greek argument that Libya 
and Turkey share no border in the Mediterranean Sea. 
In addition to the above, accumulative strains over the last few months 
between the two countries have amplified the peril of vehement eruptions in the 
region. The monstrous conception of "Blue Homeland" doctrine has become overriding 
in Turkish officials airing. This doctrine widens defence conceptualization counting 
Turkey's maritime borders as of same importance as (as defined in Turkish – not Greek 
– eyes) its land borders. On top of that, in February 2019, the Turkish fleet conducted 
the largest naval exercise in its history, identified as “Blue Homeland”. Exercise time 
was chosen deliberately as a retort to the establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean 
Gas Forum (EMGF) one month prior, an organization in which Turkey is not a member. 
1. UNCLOS Provisions and Relative Definitions 
The United Nations (U.N.) Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS) is an 
international agreement that stemmed from the third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea in Montego Bay, Cuba in 1982. The UNCLOS (UNCLOS III),defines 
and determines the rights and responsibilities of states vis-à-vis the use of the world's 
oceans, setting rules for the management of the seas, the environment, and the 
exploitation of the living and non-living natural resources. The convention is a 
comprehensive agreement “intended to establish a new regime for the seas and 
oceans which will contribute to the realization of a just and equitable international 
economic order through making provision for the peaceful use of ocean space, the 
equitable and efficient management and utilization of its resources, and the study, 
protection and preservation of the marine environment” (UNCLOS, ANNEX VI, p207). 
Terms such as internal waters, territorial waters, contiguous zone, exclusive economic 
zone, continental shelf, and international waters which basically are zones which 
extend from the coast to the open seas as well as set the nations’ rights on these zones 
are introduced. With the exception of Turkey and Israel which have not yet ratified the 
convention the littoral states bordering the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean 
are under the provisions of the UNCLOS and are subsequently affected by these zones 
delimitations (JOYNER, 2009). 
The coastal state relishes full control over air navigation in the above airspace, 
while partial control over shipping (civil and military foreign ships) is provided, all by 
the influence and over the presence of territorial waters. Innocent passage by foreign 
ships is also, normally permitted. In the course of the 20th century, the typical width of 
territorial waters that countries are regularly eligible to, has been gradually expanded: 
from 3 nautical miles (5.6 km), to 6 nautical miles (11 km), and at a later time to 12 
nautical miles (22 km). Current limit has been introduced in treaty law by the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, where it clearly outlines that “every 
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state has the right to establish its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding twelve 
nautical miles, measured, from baselines” (Art.3). 
 In the territorial sea, the sovereignty of the coastal state is absolute, including 
the water column, the seabed, the subsoil (Art.2), and all living and non-living 
resources. Vessels from foreign states have the right to sail through this zone only 
when the passage is innocent and it is not detrimental to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal state (Art.19). Activities that cannot be considered innocent 
such as fishing, military exercises, espionage or bad willing actions are explicitly 
prohibited. 
2. Points of Friction I: Maritime and Aerial Zones of Influence 
More than a few of the many points of friction in the Aegean Sea deal with the 
delimitation of two countries' zones of influence on the sea and in the air around their 
corresponding territories. These issues owe their virulence to a geographical oddity of 
the Aegean Sea and its territories. Although mainland coasts of Greece and Turkey 
bordering the Aegean Sea on both sides embody coarsely equivalent segments of its 
total coastline, the vast number of the scattered Aegean islands belongs to Greece. 
Specifically, there is an array of Greek islands lined up like queued stones in 
juxtaposition with the Turkish west coast (Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and the Dodecanese 
islands). Their proximity left Turkey bereft of any noteworthy extension of its zones of 
influence beyond a few nautical miles off its shoreline.  
Zones of influence (territorial waters and national airspace) relish the right of 
extensiveness which is typically measured from the contiguous territory of the state in 
question, including state’s islands, any potential extension of such zones would 







(Figure 8: From left to the right, (a) 6 nautical miles (nmi): Current territorial waters recognized by Greece and 
Turkey, and airspace as recognized by Turkey, (b) 10 nmi: Current national airspace claimed by Greece, (c) 12 nmi: Upper limit 
of territorial waters and national airspace defined as a legal right by UNCLOS, possible future claims by Greece and Turkey 
Source:w: en: Χρήστης: Future Perfect at Sunrise (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aegean_6_nm.svg), "Aegean 6 
nm", https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/ 3.0 / νομικός κώδικας) 
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Rendering view for those issues between two countries is that Turkey’s concern 
is that extension of Greece’ zones of influence would turn Aegean Archipelagos 
commendably to a “Greek Lake”. Conversely, Greece’s alleged concern is that Turkey  
may be attempting  to "subjugate half of the Aegean", i.e. establish Turkish zones of 
influence towards the middle of the Aegean, beyond the chain of outlying Greek 
islands, turning these into a kind of exclave surrounded by Turkish waters, and thus 
detaching them off from their continental part of the country. 
In contrast with the UNCLOS provisions that described above, in the case of 
Greece and Turkey the bilaterally claimed territorial waters are still at 6 miles. The 
likelihood of an extension to 12 miles has fired Turkish apprehensions over a potential 
unbalanced upturn in controlled space by Greece. Turkey is not a signatory of the 
convention and therefore considers itself as not being bound by it. Turkey’s stance on 
the convention is as res inter alias acta, i.e. as non-member/not being bound by as 
well. On the other side Greece, as a founding signatory to the convention, has 
repeatedly stated that it reserves the right to apply the relevant rule and extend its 
waters to 12 miles in a future point of its choice, even though there has never been 
such an attempt so far.  
In the early 1990s tensions over the 12-mile dispute reached a limit between 
the two countries, when UNCLOS was about to come into effect. On June 8, 1995, the 
Turkish parliament authoritatively avowed that in case Greece unilaterally extended its 
territorial waters to 12 miles that would automatically constitute a casus belli to 
Turkey, i.e. reason to go to war. This declaration has been judged by Greece as an 
abuse of the Charter of the United Nations, which forbids "the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state". 
3. Points of Friction II: National Airspace  
The airspace shrouding a state's territory and its adjacent territorial waters is 
typically defined as the national airspace. It provides the sovereign state a great 
degree of control over foreign air traffic.  
Unlike civil aviation’s unrestricted overflying foreign airspaces, military tail-
numbered aircrafts of all types are not allowed to cross other countries’ airspaces 
(dissimilar to military vessels through territorial waters). Notably in the case of Greece 
and Turkey there’s another unique situation as Greek delimitation of airspace does not 
coincide with the boundary of its territorial waters. While airspace claim is 10nm (= 
19km), territorial waters paradoxically are limited to 6nm (11,4km). 
Turkey since 1974, has questioned the legitimacy of the outer 4-mile belt of 
airspace that ranges beyond the Greek territorial waters. Turkey makes use of 
International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) of 1948 acts, and a reference on 
binding definition that “…both zones must coincide”. Greece, however supports, that 
airspace claim of 10nm predates ICAO, as having been fixed in 1931 and was 
recognized by all neighbouring states (Turkey included), well before and after 1948, 
hence constitutes an established right. The 10-mile claim is alternatively a construal for 
the reserved Greek position deriving from the UNCLOS, to partly (or wholly)-ad libitum 
(at will)-extend its territorial waters to 10nm (and up to 12nm) and according to ICAO, 
its airspace accordingly.  
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4. Points of Friction III: Continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) 
In 1982 UNCLOS the term and concept of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was 
firstly incorporated. As a belt where coastal state has sovereign rights to explore and 
exploit, to conserve and manage the natural resources, (either living or non-living), of 
the waters above to the seabed, the seabed itself and its subsoil, EEZ provides also 
sovereign rights for the economic exploitation and exploration for the littoral state.  
What are especially important are the stemming rights to production of energy 
from the water (waves), currents and winds, as well as the rights to establish artificial 
islands and installations, to establish and use of marine scientific research and rights 
for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, all attributed to the 
sovereign coastal state (Art.33). 
The baselines which define, by measurement the territorial sea, also delineate 
the limit of EEZ, by extending until 200 miles where applicable. Inside the EEZ, foreign 
states have the rights of navigation and over flight, subject to regulation of the coastal 
states; they also have rights to lay submarine cables and pipelines, as well as other 





(Figure 8: The UNCLOS Maritime Zones, Source: http://www.2b1stconsulting.com/eez/) 
 
An additional important zone established by UNCLOS convention is the 
Continental Shelf (Fig.8). This seabed zone “is the natural prolongation of the landmass 
territory to the continental margin’s outer edge, or 200 nautical miles from the coastal 
state’s baseline, whichever is greater”. The littoral states have the right to claim the 
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outer continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles but not beyond 350 nautical miles 
from the baselines as long, as the shelf is geologically (not quite the case though also 
legal perception governs this definition) considered formatted on a prolongation by 
nature’s process of the state’s continental shelf. Moreover it may never exceed 100 
nautical miles be-yond the 2.500 m isobaths (A virtual line which connects all points 






(Figure 9: Conflicting claims to the continental shelf and EEZ areas in the eastern Mediterranean. Blue: areas claimed 
by Greece and Cyprus in line with the UNCLOS; red: areas claimed by Turkey.) 
 
Quantitative determination of the degree that off the Turkish coast Greek 
islands should be taken into account for defining the Greek and Turkish economic 
zones has historically been a point of friction between Turkey and Greece (Fig.9). 
Turkey tries to redefine the clearly circumscribed UNCLOS delineation by arguing that 
the conception of "continental shelf", by its substantial definition, infers that distances 
measurements refer to the continental mainland, claiming that the sea-bed of the 
Aegean geologically forms a natural protraction of the Anatolian land mass. Thus 
meaning, that Turkey would then be entitled to economic zones, almost up to the 
median line of the Aegean Sea. That would cost Greece the loss of half its territorial 
waters and the unavoidable deprivation of the encompassed eastern Aegean Greek 
islands which would remain as Greek exclaves.  Oppositely Greece, states that all 
islands retain full influence on an equal basis as the mainland does. 
The accurate delimitation of the economic zones is the only solemn and lawful 
unique issue against of all the Aegean disputes that systematically and unlawfully 
Turkey has risen, where Greece has legitimately acknowledged that Turkey has valid 
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interests that might entail some international process of arbitration or compromise 
between the two states. 
5. Points of Friction IV: The “Mavi Vatan” Phantom 
Turkey’s narrative of “Blue Homeland” (“Mavi Vatan”) attracts its roots from 
the Ottoman Empire Era. Neo-ottoman illusionist Turkish officials, Admiral Cihat Yaycı 
(Chief of Staff of the Turkish Navy Commander) and Admiral Cem Gurdeniz were either 
ordered or initiated (the two notions are very close and almost coincide in modern 
Turkey’s regime) to create and develop an irredentist and expansionist concept and 
doctrine -one out of many of this conquering type that Turkey has recently and 
tactically shed light upon - back in 2006. 
 
   
 
 
(Figure 10: “Mavi Vatan” stands for “Blue Homeland”, another late Turkish revisionist neo-confection). 
 
“Blue Homeland” presented in the public map-photograph by Turkey’s 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, depicting half of the Aegean Sea belonging to Turkey, 
while Greek islands in the eastern part, as long as eastern Crete showed literally with 
no maritime zone at all, even their sovereignty status was unclear.  
Greek state responded immediately with demarche, however references to the 
so called “Blue Homeland” became persistent and frequent even by Turkey diplomacy 
representatives in the most official manner. 
On 13 November 2019, Turkey lodged officially claims in the United Nations 
(UN) to Exclusive Economic Zones in the Eastern Mediterranean that are in conflict 
with UNCLOS based Greek entitlements to the same areas – containing a sea zone 
spreading west of the Aegean island of Rhodes and south of Crete. The 
aforementioned assertions reveal Ankara's perception of a "Blue Homeland" (Mavi 
Vatan). Greece condemned and rejected these claims as legally ungrounded, 
misplaced and illogical, and an outright violation of Greece's sovereignty. 
Turkey holds the view, unlike majority of other states, that no islands can have 
a full Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and should only be eligible to a 12 nautical mile 
reduced EEZ or no EEZ at all rather than the usual 200 miles that Turkey and every 
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other country are entitled to. In that vein, Turkey, on December 2019, claimed 
outrageously for the first time that the Greek island of Kastellorizo shouldn't have any 
EEZ at all, because, from the Principle of Equity constructed Turkish standpoint, it is a 
minor island straightway across the Turkish mainland [which, according to Turkey, has 
the longest coastline(half of the Greek coastline officially  as indicated above)], and 
therefore is not eligible to engender a maritime jurisdiction area four thousand times 
larger than its own land acreage. A month later, Turkish President Erdogan threw 
down the gauntlet even for the rights of Crete, Greece's largest island and 5th largest 
in the Mediterranean, saying that "They talk about a continental shelf around Crete. 
There is no continental shelf around the islands, there is no such thing, there, it is only 
sovereign waters." 
6. The blundering assertions of “Special Circumstances” 
Back in the end of 1986, Turkey proceeded unilaterally to a two hundred mile 
EEZ proclamation in the Black Sea. This act was compliant with the provisions of 
UNCLOS, which Turkey has incongruously never signed or ratified. Concomitantly, 
Turkey came to an agreement on EEZ delimitation with the USSR, former Soviet Union. 
This pact used the equidistance method. There were no provisions of “special 
circumstances” or any reference to enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, anywhere within 
the document. 
By acting in that manner, Turkey has committed a historical, legally-binding 
blunder. Hence, by accepting the conception of the EEZ as pronounced through 
UNCLOS, has weakened its stance apropos Greece and offered an unexpected “Achilles 
heel” in its dispute with Greece as this was a fatal mistake for Turkey. Turkey’s 
constructionist attempts to uphold a double standard position vis-à-vis the treatment 
of two semi-enclosed seas (Black and Aegean) is problematic to defend. It is simply an 
attempt to make a clear differentiation between delimitation of its maritime 
boundaries in the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea, by adopting a double standards legal 
datum. A country simply cannot make a convincing argument by selectively picking the 
parts of the convention it prefers and serve its current interests. 
One of the most common practises that Turkey has implemented the recent 
years is to contrive and add or create through security escalations, new issues for 
negotiation to the table, such as “grey zones”, demilitarization of islands and span of 
territorial waters as analysed above. 
Appealing to International Court of Justice, means by default, acceptance in 
advance of its jurisdiction and its decisions, an issue that Turkey knows well and does 
its best to avoid by manoeuvring through arbitrary legitimization practices. 
7. The Greek EEZ Agreements and the Illegitimate GNA Covenant 
Controversial opinions arise between experts of UNCLOS and geopolitics on the 
issue of whether bringing the dispute in front of International Court of Justice (which is 
the only jurisdictional body empowered to decide for such a matter), serves Greece’s 
vested interest. 
Different standpoints cite dissimilar previous decisions of the Court in order to 
justify which stance fits the best for the case of Greece. Rarely, discourse leads to the 
very common and comparable case study of the delimitation of EEZ between USA and 
USSR in the Alaska-Siberia region. 
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Delimitation between the United States and Russia was first settled between 
the United States and the USSR on the 1st of June, 1990 (Fig.11). In a nutshell, 
someone has only to look at the map (Fig.11) and will evidently ratiocinate that the 
agreement granted all American islands in the region with full effect and this is one of 




(Figure 11: EEZ Delimitation between United States and Russia). 
 
UNCLOS inheritance and provisions implementation would just let Greece to 
secure the economic integrity and prosperity and exploit continental and archipelagic 
space, reaching region’s highest potential. Comparably, Turkey retains only three 
islands in the Aegean Sea. A common purpose for coastal states to unilaterally adopt 
the 200 mile EEZ is mostly to deal with other states overfishing and overexploitation of 
their coastal fish stocks. 
Accordingly, a sizable portion of the Greek fishing fleet has traditionally been 
seeking fisheries in international or ex-international water, mainly in the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. Now that many states have demarcated 
EEZs with neighbours or declared their own, Greek fishermen have limited access to 
traditional fishing grounds. To this effect, Greek EEZ, would be advantageous to the 
fishing sector of the country, which, despite its small contribution (approximately 1 
percent) to gross domestic product (GDP), has a substantial role in the nutrition of the 
Greek population by supplying protein of high nutritional value at a moderately low 
cost. States in quest of delimiting their maritime boundaries ought to cogitate certain 
facts and options as they evolve their positions and resolve them through negotiations 
or third-party processes. As Jonathan Charney and Lewis M. Alexander state in their 
Law rulebook, “International Maritime Boundaries”: 
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 “1. It is clear that primary attention will be placed upon the geography of 
the coastline.  
2. The equidistant line will be considered in most circumstances as a basis 
for analysing the boundary situation. It may very well be used in some form or variant 
to generate the boundary itself. 
3. A precise definition of the boundary line may be necessary at some point 
in the future. The boundary states would be well advised to memorialize their 
settlement in a technically precise form that would be unchallengeable in the future. 
The association of technical experts at the appropriate stages is strongly advised. 
4. The investment of substantial resources to study geological and 
geomorphological facts may be useful in either international litigation or negotiation. 
Knowledge of ongoing exploitation of living and non-living resources by the boundary 
states in the boundary area is likely to be useful. 
5. Maritime boundary delimitations cannot be divorced from the status of 
the general relations between the boundary states. Actively hostile relations will doom 
boundary settlement negotiations and will make cooperative arrangements impossible 
to negotiate and implement. 
6. Joint development or management zones that-cross boundaries, revenue 
sharing and management cooperation are all possible options.”  
Although, Greece upholds maritime borders with Albania, Italy, Libya, Egypt, 
Cyprus, and Turkey, it has unfortunately, demarcated its EEZ and continental shelf 
boundaries with only two of them and yet no fully, so far. Followed the existing 
delimitation of the continental shelf agreed in 1977, Italy and Greece on June 8, 2020, 
came up with signed agreement of their EEZ boundaries. The delimitation was 
grounded on the median line and it’s significant to remark that all the islands on the 
Ionian Sea have been taken into account with this delimitation. 
Later the same year, on August 6, 2020 Greece and Egypt have agreed to a 
partial delimitation and of 104 n.m. not following the median line standard. Greece in 
that case received 45% of the area and Egypt received 55%. In addition to this, the 
easternmost part of the region is not included, leaving outside of the bilateral 
agreement the eastern Mediterranean boundaries and the affected acreage generated 
by the influence of Kastelorizo island. It starts south of the island of Crete and extends 
up to the island of Rhodes (Fig.12). 
Having left, even temporarily Kastellorizo out of the delimitation process is 
presumed a considerable and historical geostrategic infelicity. Provided that the 
agreement would apply to total maritime area between the two countries, Greece’ 
boundaries could be extended 86 n.m. more (total of 190 n.m.). 
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(Figure 12: Map of the EEZ delimitation with Italy and Egypt (Source: Angelos Syrigos, Atlas of the Greek Turkish 
Relations, Newspaper Kathimerini, December 12, 2021). 
 
It is also apparent that Egypt persevered on this fractional delimitation because 
it wanted to show Turkey that another partial delimitation may be feasible within two 
Muslim nations on the leftover part. Furthermore, Greece has a long way to safeguard 
its maritime primacy as there are four more delimitations in line to accomplish 
(Albania, Libya, Cyprus, and Turkey). However, the repudiation of Cyprus as a 
prioritised state for EEZ demarcation and the nerveless stance over the delayed issue 
of EEZ delimitations/demarcations have a name for this static approach and 
quiescence attitude: The ”phobic syndrome”. 
Turkey’s president Erdoğan signed on 28 November 2019 in Istanbul, a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Tripoli-based Prime Minister of the 
Government of National Accord of Libya (GNA), Fayez al-Sarraj. According to the above 
document maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean were demarcated between 
Turkey and Libya on an area, as Keith Johnson is Foreign Policy's global geoeconomics 
correspondent purposefully described "to write Crete, the 5th largest island of 
Mediterranean off the map entirely". 
This agreement was provocative and drew denunciation by Greece and the 
international community, including the opposing Tobruk-based government led by the 
Libyan House of Representatives, Khalifa Haftar. Furthermore a series of countries 
from all over the globe condemned this action-Cyprus, Israel, Serbia, Sweden, United 
States, , Egypt, Russia, Malta, France, Italy, Germany, Bahrein, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the 
United Arab Emirates and Arab League as a whole- as direct violation of UNCLOS as 
well as art.8 the Skhirat Agreement. The latter forbids the Libyan Prime Minister from 
exclusively settling international deals without prior acquiring consensus of all the 
cabinet members.  
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8. Benefits and Repercussions from EEZ settlements, for Gas Plans 
Concerning the first EEZ agreement with Italy, signing of an EEZ from the Greek 
perspective, has immense ramifications for Turkey’s campaigns to covet oil and gas 
resources from Greece’s maritime zone – thus deterring its efforts for complete East 
Mediterranean dominance. 
Italy is now established as an energy player, particularly by participating to the 
mega-project of the EastMed pipeline, which is planned to reach Italy with a secondary 
pipeline project, linked to the northern bracket of the EastMed taking thus active 
position and revealing its strong will to become part of the strengthening of the 
cooperation of the trilateral partnerships. The timing was also suitable, as till recently, 
Italy was struggling to serve its own interests unilaterally. This however would mean 
that Rome would risk to stay completely outside of any serious, energy business in the 
region and to manage all the impacts of geopolitical-geoeconomical developments 
from collaborations instead of being a part and a developer of them. Business-oriented 
Italian diplomacy and policy makers foresaw this contingency and decided to act. And 
so they did. 
Another case Italy had reasons to stay close was the Libyan conflict. Though it 
did not gain as much influence as they wanted over the war in Libya, Italy a European 
democratic nation with peaceful leaders and west oriented state of mind couldn’t just 
follow the example of totalitarian, authoritarian Erdogan’s regime and become hostile 
towards everyone in the neighborhood, hence it run the risk of being completely left 
on the fringes of East Mediterranean issues. On the other hand, Italy needed to adopt 
an alliance model having the Adriatic power to assert strong influence over events in 
the region, by making deals and improving multilateral relations with energy related 
rising powers such as Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt.  
As done with Italy, Greece follows faithfully the diplomatic pathway to resolve 
issues peacefully, as several times has called to do with Turkey, however if its maritime 
space is violated would not hesitate a military confrontation with a fellow NATO 
member. In light of the Greek-Italian EEZ deal it is unlikely that Turkey will provoke a 
war as Italy, one of the major powers in the European Union, despite Ankara’s 
objections has long-established that islands do indeed have an EEZ. 
The next maritime border demarcation pact between Egypt and Greece 
represents a straight counteract to the maritime border demarcation agreement 
between Turkey and the Government of National Accord in Libya. The Greece-Egypt 
agreement was pronounced as “a new stage in their bilateral relations” by leaders of 
both states. Likewise, it marks a significant step in hardening an anti-Turkish axis in the 
Middle East, which is led by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel, and supported by France 
and the United Arab Emirates. The scuffle in the Eastern Mediterranean is over 
development and energy use rights and the vying yearnings of Egypt and Turkey for 
serving as regional energy hubs. This struggle also touches on the antagonism for 
political leadership in the Middle East and the tension between the realistic Arab 
states and the political Islam supportive ones, driven mainly by Turkey and Qatar. 
Israel stands alongside Greece and Egypt, but maintains its interest in reducing overall 
strains and preserving stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, in order to achieve 
economic cooperation with its neighbours and avert the hastening of arms races in the 
peripheral. 
Over the last two decades Cyprus has reached demarcation agreements with 
several states (Egypt, Lebanon, Israel), Greece however was inactive and diffident to 
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do so. Greece eluded signing an analogous settlement with Nicosia due to concerns of 
worsening of the conflict in Cyprus. Due to Turkey's assertive policy and the need to 
counteract the Libyan-Turkish illicit covenant, Greece's position shifted and now 
Greece and Cyprus are reassessing ground to sign a mutual agreement. 
Egypt on the other side perceives the demarcation of its maritime boundary 
with Greece as a supplementary enhancement to the thriving strategic ties between 
the two states. It pursues to delineate a red line for Turkish activity in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, after having set a red line in Libya. The settlement also seeks to assist 
the two states to discover and develop energy resources in their economic waters and 
endorse the tripartite agreement for interconnecting power grids of Egypt, Greece, 
and Cyprus, as a reaction to the Turkish-Libyan efforts to draw a maritime border that 
erects a barrier between them. Moreover, from Cairo's perspective an extra benefit of 
the agreement is that any Turkish attempt to challenge it will now put Ankara in direct 
conflict with the European Union. The agreement with Greece ends up for Egypt 
having more limited sea space than it would have had in case it had recognized the 
Turkish-Libyan covenant. But Egypt in turn, takes credit by showing its loyalty to the 
anti-Turkish axis and thus demonstrates Turkey’s miscarriage to put a wedge between 
Cairo and Athens symbolizing at the same time its commitment to international 
legality. 
The EEZ agreement between Egypt and Greece, functions as an additional layer 
in the consolidation of the EMGF, that led alliance to become an international 
organization factoring in France as a standard member and US as currently an 
observer. This agreement will also heighten the prospects for the EastMed pipeline 
project to trade natural gas from Israel via Cyprus and Greece to Europe, which was 
trilaterally approved over the past few months despite the downfall of energy prices 
that raised reservations on the economic viability of the project. Furthermore, the 
normalization agreement between Israel and the UAE fosters solidifying the anti-
Turkish arc, which is evolving from an economic axis focused mainly on gas into a 
regional alliance that combines economic, political, and security interests. 
Greece and Egypt are not fond of a military opposition with Turkey, which on 
the other hand, being a NATO Member State, has considerable reservations about 
confronting another member state. In addition, Egypt is currently facing intense 
economic challenges, with the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam crisis and always has to 
manage the Sinai Peninsula originating terror threats. Hence, getting involved in direct 
military conflict with Turkey – which would undermine domestic development 
endeavors that are currently its highest priority – is for Egypt an unattractive last 
resort. Consecutively, Cairo and Athens do not have great expectations for a political 
resolution that would ease relations with Ankara, particularly while Turkish President 
Recep Tayip Erdogan holds the reigns of power tightly and promotes a political 
strategy that conveys neo-Ottomanism. 
After the gas deal, in their trilateral partnership framework with Cyprus, 
between Egypt and Israel was signed in 2018, President el-Sisi stated that Egypt 
"scored a big goal," implying the Turks as the epicenter. Additionally, when the Greek-
Egyptian EEZ agreement was signed, Egyptian newspapers reveled in "a second goal." 
The demarcation of the maritime border is conceived in Egypt and Greece as a vital 
move in the diplomatic campaign against Turkey.  
Last but not least, along with delineating their economic zone – and 
threatening to use force if this is encroached– Egyptian-Greek campaign has in store 
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incoming pressure both from NATO and the EU, for Turkey. Another goal that was 
finely served was the exposure of the bonds between Turkey and Islamist and Salafi-
jihadist terror elements. Not to forget, the achievement of institutionalizing the gas 
forum, with the surrounding anti-Turkish axis around it. The overall objective of these 
moves is to contain and repress Turkish influence in the region. 
Unceasingly, increasing energy needs, especially in natural gas (approx. 52 
b.c.m. per year), lead Turkey planning of extending its activities in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. At the moment, Ankara is heavily dependent on Russia and Iran, 
importing 55%-60% of its natural gas from the former and 20% from the latter. In 
effect, mr. Erdogan has maneuvered Turkey into a strategic prison of its own making. 
In Turkey, Russia and Iran have acquired a new energy dependent client.  
In its effort to secure alternative energy sources, not only for its industry or 
continuous growing population demands, but also for achieving its geostrategic 
regional pretensions, of being a peripheral superpower, Turkey needs to subverse the 
existing status in the region, by taking risky actions and launching statements, if not 
threats. Acting in that manner it seeks for making claims to South East Mediterranean 
energy reserves, as a part of its long-term strategy. Cyprus’ EEZ is not the only 
maritime area targeted by Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO)’s extensive and long-
term planning, but also Greek continental shelf and influenced potential EEZ areas. 
 
 
F. THE SCENARIOS OF EXPLOITING  
The last decade discoveries of gas reserves in the Ionian Sea and south of Crete 
along with those of the Eastern Mediterranean (of the coasts of Cyprus, Lebanon and 
Israel) have gotten the region to the public’s attention. Eastern Mediterranean is fated 
to become an important gas domain and without question it remains home to large 
gas resources, albeit countries in the region, apart from Egypt, have been quite 
procrastinators to reach them. Greece has the sole opportunity to be sited in an area 
that covers three times its geographical area and in the meantime comprises, along 
with Cyprus, a main Eastern energy postern to European Union. 
The solid regional benefits emanate from those findings are expected to lead to 
further geopolitical clashes over territory or natural resources, in comparison to what 
has already supervened. In case these impending disputes remain unattended, they 
could drive to tensions and even armed encounters. Greece has clearly one choice 
when it comes to defending its sovereignty over its Territorial Waters, Continental 
Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), declare, explore and use it. If Greece wants 
to exploit these potential reserves, it has to improve a comprehensive strategy for the 
region that both promotes its sovereignty and augments its capabilities in the area, 
while maintaining a stance “between alliance and entente” with its neighbours and the 
international community. 
It is a duty, to present and future generations, to scrutinize ways to peacefully 
explore and exploit these resources and shape a vigorous development plan in order 
to create a more prosperous and promising future a milestone that can be realized so 
long as the exploitation of natural resources will occur within secure and safe environs. 
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1. The potentiality of exploitation and the prerequisites 
The general East Mediterranean energy reserves status, encompassing an 
exploration neophyte Greece, has created potential new gas exporters dealing with 
various challenges. After making a series of momentous gas discoveries, both Israel 
and Cyprus are now trying to find solutions on how to utilize them. One direct and 
simple utilization policy is to satisfy internal energy demand, supplant oil in the 
domestic energy mix, produce more electricity from gas and thus lessen reliance on 
imported oil. Hence, within a decade, the above states will gain the option of exporting 
excess gas to markets where they can fetch favourable prices and become exporters. 
Therefore they will also be able to contribute to European gas supply security by 
offering a diversified source and route energy components.  
However, the question of whether the discovered reserves can be channelled 
to the domestic and international markets in a timely manner entails thorough 
considerations. First, satisfaction of domestic demand and generating surplus for 
overseas trade dictates the express development of the discovered fields, i.e., 
transforming reserves into production capacity. The probability of companies to 
perform costly exploration and field development endeavours, passes through their 
capability to commercialize their discoveries with a favourable rate of return. From this 
perspective, much will depend on the gas price the governments will be asking for on 
the domestic market, the stability of the countries’ regulatory, fiscal and gas policies, 
and the political atmosphere. 
 Regrettably, the states in the peripheral haven’t yet established an effective 
and successful energy policy that takes into account the above-mentioned challenges 
along with the region’s geopolitical changes. Lacking the export option within an 
operative policy scheme, not only will they be compelled to draw companies for 
upstream business, but also the development of the resources may be seriously 
hindered. This inevitably brings us to the future export potential of the countries in the 
region. Actually, the future of complete East Mediterranean Region depends on the 
projected evolution in the international market. According to BP-represents the most 
conservative research-estimates, the global proved reserves of natural gas (those that 
can be recovered with reasonable certainty in the future from known reservoirs under 
existing economic and operating conditions) are 7,000 Tcf, (Table 17) including Russia’s 
reserves of 1,160 Tcf, Qatar’s reserves of880 Tcf, and Turkmenistan’s reserves of 620 
Tcf. Moreover, there is a significant prospective for shale gas with a recent estimate of 
7,200 Tcf of technically recoverable resources (EIA, 2013). 
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(Table 17: Global proved natural gas reserves from 2000 to 2019, Source: Statista 2021) 
 
As stated by FLOW Energy studies the most uncharted energy areas in the East 
Mediterranean basin belongs to Greece. Considering the already discovered reserves 
to those still undiscovered Greece comes as the third more unexplored country 




(Table 18: Country Unexplored Gas Reserves Rate) 
1. Energy Alliances: Promote Peace or Prepare Conflict? 
In contrast with the anticipated hopes and expectations initially, the neo-
reserves of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean have not-yet-brought peace in the 
region. Historically there’s a degree of causality in that fact. Countries with natural 
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wealth and especially energy resources are destined to be the apple of discord for –not 
only-its neighbors, depended of the value of their affluence. Especially when in 
complex geopolitical environments are more prone to conflicts with its potential rivals. 
In the previous chapters it was argued that energy catalyzed the formation of 
the trilateral and multilateral partnerships but obviously has not yet catalyzed peace in 
the region. The positive effects and the prospects of the entrance and evolution of gas 
in the subsystem of the Southeastern Mediterranean are not shared equally, though 
they have contributed to the shifting power balances in the region, but among certain 
actors. 
 Through the systematic analysis of the preceding chapters, we have now 
reached a point to say that, so far, the result of those formations and emerged 
alliances is not peace but reconfiguration and reshuffling of the state-actors in the 
peripheral. A new “bipolar-tension” model (Kontos and Bitsis 2018) emerged in the 
region, with Turkey being one power pole along with its forcible strategies vis-à-vis the 
energy developments, while the other power pole involves the multifarious 
partnerships (trilateral mostly) between Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus and France, Italy, 
USA, Qatar, UAE as observers.  
 There is no doubt that the two above poles are antagonistic, regardless of the 
fact that all participants claim that trilaterals mean no harm of anyone interests 
(Turkey included) in East Mediterranean but to promote peace and partnership, if not 
at least to even share benefits of collaboration with the member states. Even Turkey as 
long as pending issues as the Cyprus Problem-it’s a Fallacy and not a “Problem” as 
I.Kouskouvelis rightfully (Kouskouvelis, 2017) states-are permanently resolved 
(Marathovouniotis 2018). Ironically, the resolution of the Cyprus Problem never was 
more complex before: energy neo-reserves not only have not provided motivations for 
peace and convergence but on the contrary, they have become a point of contention 
that aggravates inter-communal tensions.  
 And this is not the worst part: Energy discoveries may potentially generate a 
kind of resentment within the triangle of Cyprus-Egypt-Israel. Egypt’s equivocal stance 
on the EastMed project may witness this view, while disgruntlement of certain Israeli 
circles over Cyprus-Israeli monetization agreement delays on the Aphrodite gas-field 
(Block 12 of Cyprus’s EEZ) and Cyprus-Egypt agreement on Aphrodite to Egypt, do not 
refute that view either(Coren 2019; Ellinas 2018). 
 By distilling the above content one is sure to say: If we neglect the benefits that 
until now have been gained by all sides of the triangles, is the emerging security 
structure with the powerful energy components, enhanced by the neo-reserved 
dynamics, viable and instrumental for peace and development in the East 
Mediterranean?  
 In terms of warranting the Greece’s “next day” of its own discoveries, the 
trilateral partnerships have created flourishing anticipation for such a case, when and 
if that “next day” ever come. Smooth and tangible collaboration in low-politics 
reinforce these prospects. However, and despite any oratorical manifestos or a handful 
of projected expectations, major practical steps frontward in the areas of joint defence 
and energy cooperation have not been made yet – or, are not yet visible. Partnerships 
in question are not as firm as they may appear inasmuch as partaking states need to 
retain their options open. Apparently, this rhetoric, the cultivation of expectations, and 
sometimes the overstatement of some political-diplomatic accomplishments, serve 
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well the agenda of the contributing governments’ concerning their domestic 
audiences. 
 But every cloud has a silver lining, thus to say there is a dual effect that derives 
from the complexity of the above approach. First, attention of third parties - e.g. 
states, companies, and international organizations;- is attracted by the collective 
intense interstate momentum that has been gained within and around of those 
partnerships and that reflects on the heating of their interest. Second, the alliances 
networks become beneficial —provided that contributing states are open to it— for 
the agenda and objectives of these third parties, which in many cases are great 
powers. The US Secretary of State’s participation in 6th trilateral Cyprus-Greece-Israel 
meeting reaffirms this viewing platform. 
 By no doubt the occurring conditions facilitate the exploration and exploitation 
of Greece’s potential gas reserves. Such developments can provide the state early 
capitalization of its energy assets and function as a propulsive force towards further 
active cooperation, thus initiating an expansionary spiral. 
  It seems that Eastern Mediterranean progresses are not simply a regional affair 
but a subject of broader geopolitical activity and even antagonism between great 
powers.  
2. The Feasibility of EastMed in the post Covid-19 Era 
Eastern Mediterranean states were zealous to engage in building a common 
energy market and invest in infrastructure at the beginning of the previous year.  
The outbreak of Covid-19 however, has frozen their plans. The unimaginably severe 
economic corollaries of the pandemic on global energy prices have led to drastic re-
evaluations by investors, governments and private, over cost-intensive mega 
infrastructure energy projects. 
 The groundswell of the pre-Covid-19 recent period energy integration provided 
a potential of boosting regional cooperation that now in the Covid-19 times is equally 
shrank. As the pandemic expanses its developments around the world and of course 
Eastern Mediterranean are weakening the energy component of the region, making it 
less reliable and so the approaches of the states that constitute the energy alliances. 
They are focused mainly on security components and shifting the center of alliances 
interest to cooperation and how to deal with existing contest and challenges, a 
constructive approach towards securitization of the basin. 
This introvert shifting is no strange to the countries of the area. From the 
geopolitical point of view they have always been among energy-rich and energy-
hungry civilizations, the crossroad between Gulf hydrocarbon-paradise and Europe 
fuel-greedy states. Their transitional function didn’t prevent them from being 
consumers themselves, however. 
As analysed previously, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt have achieved via their 2000s 
and 2020s discoveries to become game changers in the region. Greece with the 
“heritage” of its recent bailout EU programmes acknowledged this necessity quite 
soon and therefore foresaw the incentives. All in all Greek administrations had to 
undertake the appropriate initiatives and so they did. The environment was the 
suitable for such a development and the triangular alignments were a reality. 
 Every single side of each triangle had an auspicious “oracle” for its energy 
prospects. Cyprus, a fully energy dependent country, electrically isolated was totally 
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reliant on sea transported costly energy imports. After the Aphrodite gas field was 
discovered (6.000km3), the energy insecurity state became in one night a potential 
energy provider.  
Israel, another geopolitically isolated state-entity, believed to have zero 
resources in the past time and known only for its oppositions and wars with a “sea” of 
Arabs and the Palestinian Issue problematic, was graced with 800-1000km3 of natural 
gas discoveries as well. 
 Finally, with an already on going exploitative energy sector, with its own oil and 
gas, Egypt has struggled to feed its unremittingly growing domestic demand. It was for 
Zohr-a giga gas discovery of 850km3-that Egypt managed to calm its emerging energy 
sufficiency, which along with its important liquefaction infrastructure can upgrade 
country’s role in the region as a prevailing energy hub. 
During their diplomatically deployed pursuit for potential buyers and efforts for 
rerouting the above promising energy producers, primarily Greece-and secondary 
Jordan and Palestinian Authority (PA)-were met to channel their newly discovered 
energy riches to greater and broader markets and founded EMGF, the accord beneath 
East Med pipeline vision. With an aim to coordinate gas trade, align energy policies, set 
prices, merge infrastructures, organize and trace funds for mega projects, such as 
EastMed pipeline, the partners were seeking to strengthen their energy supply and 
security and the Forum was the best option. The above transregional device is 
pioneering in many aspects. It brings closer Israel and PA, Egypt and Jordan creating 
dialogue and conversation channels among them with a sole purpose of joining 
national interests towards energy cooperation.  
 As clearly stated in preceding chapters the existing security component within 
the triangles, was in embryonic stage before Covid-19 expansion, however it was still 
considered a step forward and in some cases (Israel, Egypt or the PA) facilitated 
collaboration in the energy field in an otherwise non-friendly diplomatic environment. 
 12 months before however, pandemic changed the setup dramatically. Though 
Greece along with Cyprus and Israel had just co-signed the EastMed pipeline 
realization, the emerged Covid-19 led to a global halt the economy and so the region 
followed the ever-growing China’s patterns of collapse. The East Mediterranean a 
transport and industry hub was severely affected in terms of economy of all aspects. 
With the emerging lockdown the global economy pace touched the idle and so did the 
energy market. With energy contracts and securities of negative nominal value a sense 
of despair was spread as quickly as the virus itself in all energy business and immobility 
grounded all energy activities, production, transportation, up-mid-downstreaming 
except of course storage and energy logistics where the excess of energy had to be 
managed promptly. 
The drop in energy demand as per International Energy Association’s 
quantification is 25% per week for countries in full lockdown and 18% for countries in 
partial lockdown(Table 19). 
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(Table 19: Global Gas Demand Projected Forecasts) 
 
As expected, the decline in demand led energy prices at a global minimum, 
which coincided with the Russian-Saudi oil price short-war of March 2020 and 
tailspined the prices even further. Ultimately it appears the corona-induced 
disappearance of global energy demand generated the gas glut which in turn, led to 
the historic first of a negative oil price for future May 2020 trades. 
However, the East Med pipeline — which upon completion would be the 
longest undersea pipeline in the world — was always much more of a political venture 
than a solid marketable endeavor. The path of the projected pipeline runs through 
zones of Greece and Cyprus, disputed heavily by Turkey, and also active geological 
fault lines and deep trenches. These geopolitical and technical challenges could 
theoretically be surmounted, yet industry experts claim that the major hindrance to 
the East Med pipeline realization is its commercial feasibility. With a valued $7 billion 
price tag, there are reservations that Israeli and Cypriot gas would remain competitive 
by the time it reached Europe. For quite a few years the European Commission has 
been reckoning the likelihood of committing to the pipeline, but at this stage is 
improbable to back it fiscally. 
Rationally, these developments misspent the potential for the evolving energy 
market in the Eastern Mediterranean. Trust and reliability in the energy sector is 
harmed and notwithstanding that growth will someday, sooner or later resume, the 
future of the EastMed pipeline project is uncertain and the EMGF has lost its 
momentum. The latter is particularly important for Greece (if not only), since the 
EMGF does not only matter to energy, but it is also a counter balancing force against 
Turkey’s influence and belligerence in the region. 
In terms of energy, Anatolian neighbours consider themselves as a great 
regional power and an energy hub, among Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan and Europe. Burying 
its head in the sand, Ankara while it ignores its energy poverty and its deteriorating 
economy, at the same time it can’t get rid its bellicose megalomania and behaves 
pugnaciously. With no doubt it feels endangered by the aspiring energy players in the 
EMGF and its insecurity flares up with the developments in the defense sector of the 
state actors of the region. 
 As argued above Turkey is semi-isolated has no important friends and runs out 
of cash and time. Covid-19 came about time to worsen things further for the taunter of 
the region. 
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 Greece along with Cyprus have succeeded to marginalise the interests of 
Turkey not only in the sphere of East Mediterranean energy market but even broadly 
with their common energy-related plans and ambitions and doubtlessly they shutter 
Ankara’s objectives and visions for supremacy, energy security and reduction of import 
dependence. Propelled by “Mavi Vatan”-type illusions, Turkey proceed to drill on the 
shores of the at least disputed TRNC (if legitimate at all) and also concluded a mock 
accord with GNA, violating almost all articles of UNCLOS as argued above, just to 
disrupt the EastMed pipeline project. As anticipated EU has warned for sanctions 
(though it yet hasn’t imposed any) over Turkish drillings in Cyprus waters and Greece’ 
continental shelf violations and rejected the aforesaid accord unanimously. 
While Covid-19-related economic corollaries have rendered the coalescing, 
cooperation-fabricating element of a mutual energy market in the Eastern 
Mediterranean (temporarily) redundant, Turkey while cornered is still after the vision 
of regional hegemony. Consequently, the fundamental principle of cooperation, 
Security is resurfacing. EastMed in the post-Covid era although it is not considered by 
its inspirers to be a stranded asset, it demonstrates at the same time the need for 
securitization configuration of the triangles and simultaneously catalyzes Turkey’s 
appetite for expansion. A typical example of this up growing pattern is that Egypt, the 
mostly considered initiator of EMG, declared the formation of an “anti-Turkey alliance” 
a movement that was embraced by Greece, Cyprus, UAE and France and targets to 
intercept the provocative fly-overs of Turkish airplanes as well as its excavations in the 
Mediterranean waters. By all means, Egypt is transmitting a message to Anatolian 
peninsula and this does not concern energy at all, but it’s a signal of heightening bonds 
of security within the members of the EMGF. 
In parallel, Israel’s stance prone to securitization is more apparent as this was 
highlighted with the continuous convergence with the other powerful element of the 
EMGF, Greece. Their common military operations, are not secret and are legally 
backed by the trilateral provisions and accord. The outspoken defense joint 
cooperation is being enhanced lately, while Israel does not lack show of force 
operations. The offshore conducted due to “safety concerns” ballistic missile tests, on 
previous June, showcase that Israeli intentions are paired with their maritime 
capabilities reality, a reality of high precision missiles that Turkey cannot ignore. 
Under these developments, Turkey is likely staying around only for energy 
pursuit and will skip the regional dominance pretensions for the moment. On the other 
hand, Greek plans for domestic gas exploration have to be postponed along with the 
concerted energy effort of the other Mediterranean states. Impeded by the pandemic, 
the feasibility of the EastMed project remains questionable; however despite energy 
cooperation loses its traction, at least temporarily, securitisation of the Eastern 
Mediterranean is poised to increase. 
3. 1st Exploitation Scenario: Turkey to be Included 
Situation currently in the Eastern Mediterranean is disquieting. Although 
trilateral relations function as a pillar of stability, especially bilateral security junction 
between Israel and Greece, opposing interests among bigger regional players are 
triggering excessive uncertainty. Turkey in general considers it is being treated unfairly 
and begrudges what it perceives as its barring from discussions on energy discoveries. 
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However, Turkey was and is welcome to take part in the East Med Gas Forum 
(EMGF), nonetheless the terms of discourse are set by the majority, not the minority. 
Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority are already 
members of this forum and they all consent to the forum’s general principles. Turkey 
would have to comply with that principle too. 
The question of inclusivity is intricate and complex. Changes do not happen 
overnight, particularly when problems like the Cyprus question have the dynamics to 
rapidly derail intercession energies. Other constraints, such as the problematic status 
of affairs between Egypt and Turkey, need to be taken into account similarly. 
When it comes to the topical issue of gas exploration and exploitation within 
EMGF the participation of Turkey shall not be considered as lost case. The insertion of 
Palestinian Authority in the EMGF, indicates that difficulties can be overcome. 
Moreover, new efforts by Jerusalem and Ankara to normalize their ties advocate that 
collaboration on some concerns is possible without ignoring divergences on others. 
However, ongoing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean do not allow for 
much optimism that a shift towards development will ensue. An objective that would 
allow for further hopefulness would be the setting up of a cooperative platform on 
subjects that are not very fragile and sensitive. It is right where Israel and Greece 
would be worthwhile to start reconnoitring synergies with Turkey. Of course all 
interested countries of the Mediterranean would be eligible to partake, support and 
imitate such a convergence pattern. 
Furthermore, in terms of geopolitics, Greece shall ensure the rule of law in the 
region and act exemplary in international legality terms, before it proceed in disrupting 
or limiting traditional energy trade routes and achieve resource exploitation, no 
matter if EU and the US currently express their moderate support.  
In order to mitigate the above costs Greece should initiate within EMGF bodies 
bilateral maritime security cooperation with Turkey similar to the ones she has 
established with the member states, Cyprus, Israel and recently Egypt. An effective 
strategy that broadens cooperation among all states maintaining economic and other 
national interests in the area, Turkey included, may not be politically popular in the 
domestic audience, yet it would be the most tangible way of confirming that all 
governments are capable of reacting promptly to emergencies throughout the region 
and at the end will be able to exploit the regional natural resources to their advantage. 
It would take the growth of a completely new security approach, even a common 
doctrine in the region, grounded on mutual understanding, shared interests and the 
international law, which unquestionably can guarantee a peaceable cooperation 
through all neighbouring nations to the best interest of all.  
There are many grounds of mutual interest where they can begin with. 
Fundamentally and primarily, the fight against COVID-19 obliges neighbouring 
countries to enhanced coordination. While the global health crisis is still far from 
terminated, Israel and Greece have done well in containing the virus and the use of 
their “anti-Covid-19 campaigns” lessons-learnt, would certainly be beneficial for 
Turkey which yet suffers from its uncontrolled expansion. Also, cooperation on 
national economies re-launching mechanisms can be adopted by Ankara which has 
been less successful in its own battle. 
Additionally, Greece, Israel and Turkey are undergoing a similar form of Chinese 
investments. A typical example is the ports of Haifa, Piraeus, and Ambarli experience 
bonds with Chinese contractors. Without bypassing basic geopolitical calculations and 
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ties with the west, they have the option to focus on trade connectivity and promote 
their states’ welfare by capitalizing on much-needed benefits through the enactment 
of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. 
Energy transition in the post-coronavirus period is an additional area of 
common concern. Israel and Turkey have already made remarkable progress towards 
production or usage of renewables, and Greece -given its fully deployed NECP-, would 
like to draw near. The descent of gas prices due to COVID-19 and the risks of global 
warming , as incorporated in the Greek NECP and EU Green Deal strategies, inflict 
common emphasis on greener energy and zero CO2 emissions as an evident priority 
for all three nations. 
When looking closely and thoroughly it seems that there are quite many low-
politics issues to start with and usually, as it is commonly said “intentions make the 
words”, so all it takes for the two millennial neighbours is to digest the contingency of 
achieving a “win-win” approach and be apart from their ageing conflict. The 
exploitation of gas is not a narrow matter of property but a broad issue of energy 
commodity management. A marginal upstream profit can be sometimes 
counterbalanced by an average midstream activity. Instead of rallying around the flag, 
or diffidence the two sides can juxtapose, determination, positive will, trade spirit and 
most of all, good intentions. 
The key as stated previously is the bilateral security junction between Israel and 
Greece. Thirty years after the institution of fully established diplomatic affairs, the two 
states can turn a new page in their companionship, develop their partnership and take 
the initiative of inviting Turkey for an opportunity to look beyond polarization, 
illusionism and provocative and illegal policies. As argued above, should there is 
adequate political will, dialogue will distribute positive outcomes multiratelly, serving 
peace and prosperity in East Mediterranean. 
 
4. 2nd Exploitation Scenario: Turkey Self- Excluded 
Today world is better interconnected than during the Cold War years. By using 
hard power to resolve their issues today, states are faced with extremely high 
economic costs, isolation and potential exclusion from the international community. 
Multidimensional approach is more modern and convenient to resolute differences 
that are subjected to sovereignty (a fundamental dimension) within today’s globalized 
world of international security. 
Legitimacy being also an important dimension needs to be respected as well. As 
it has been analysed extensively in the previous chapter, we can briefly define it as the 
concept that provides the state the right to enact laws and rules and to act peacefully 
so as to shield its national interests and warranty sovereignty in an environment in 
which modus operandi is defined by the international law.  
Ideally the security issues that beset the region can be addressed by palpable 
collaboration among the countries bordering East Mediterranean sea. For Greece a 
long tradition and key strategy of foreign policy over time, is the compliance with 
international law as a resolving instrument to bilateral and international disputes.  
In its effort to capitalize and exploit its natural resources, Greece must realize 
that UNCLOS provisions render country all the legal and legitimate advantage over its 
neighbours. Truthfully, International Law is the only instrument that in the long run 
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can assure the security and stability in the region and provide Athens with the 
necessary legitimacy to lead in a cooperation campaign. By enhancing its trilateral 
synergies within EMGF framework with all its neighbours Greece can ensure that the 
region is both secure and accessible to exploitation practises.  
During the next 35 years the Greek state must attract enormous foreign 
investments in order to explore, discover and exploit its offshore gas fields mainly 
located in deep and ultra-deep sea water depths and in international waters. In 
compliance with international common practice, materialization of actions and 
decisions in that extent demand a geopolitical stable environment, a powerful 
deterrence capability and shall be secured with draconian means from terrorism, 
sabotage, piracy and other possible assaults.  Usually the smaller share of the costs of 
the essential defensive infrastructure of the exploration and production operations is 
born from the oil companies (on the drilling or production facilities), while the lion’s 
share of the costs is born from the state itself.  
Greece, over the past 50 years has held the view that its national interests are 
served firmly by the adherence to international law and its strategy was intended 
based on a predictable and stable Turkey. This notion must be abandoned by Greek 
foreign policy and Athens may have to get used to the idea of dealing with an 
unpredictable, instable and aggressive Turkey with its leaders often having its vox pop 
rallying around the flag, so it needs to be prepared. Greece also must leave behind the 
austerity era (2009-2018) and as professor Litsas states : “The Eastern Mediterranean 
is facing major existential dilemmas to which the primordial question “Guns or butter?” 
provides no answers. There are neither sufficient funds nor sufficient hard power 
capacities to pacify the region. That collective incapacity to resolve regional issues 
works to the benefit of Turkish strategy”. It’s not therefore about Guns or Butter. The 
monolithic view that everything is about economy that labels EU strategies and 
policies, shares no room in the classic geopolitical arena of East Mediterranean. 
If Greece means about exploiting its natural resources should: 
a. Build the essential exploration and production strategy related to 
security elements and transmit with its powerful presence its determination to protect 
the forthcoming gas offshore investments  
b. Harmonise the aforementioned strategy under the standards of the 
other EMGF powerful co-participants with high security concerns, such as Israel and 
Egypt 
c. Reverse negative momentum during the post Covid-19 era that we’re 
passing through, take the initiative to develop the security component of the existing 
co-operations within the EMGF and then encompass it in its strategy, based on the 
respect of the international law. 
d. Take into consideration that gas operation security costs in inter-
national waters are usually excessive; hence part of the future gas fields’ exploitation 
revenues drawn from the Greek state must be re-invested to the improvement of the 
Hellenic Armed Forces (especially Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard) infrastructures and 
armaments. 
 Latest tensions with Turkey have impelled Athens to revise its priorities. In the 
beginning of 2021, Greek Parliament and MoD approved and signed for new weapons 
purchases, including 18 super advanced French Rafales with their hypo strategic 
arsenal, four frigates, and four anti-submarine helicopters. Greece is also expected to 
obtain 20 F-35 stealth fighters after 2025. Greek Mod plans to recruit 15,000 personnel 
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over the next five years to promote the professionalization of the Greek Armed Forces. 
To conclude, a new Joint Special Operations Command for Greece’s elite units has 
been established by Greek MoD to operate mainly in the Aegean Sea. 
 Athens has decisively supported a non-violent settlement of Greek-Turkish 
disputes based on the principles and norms of international law. The Greek stance is 
obliged to dialogue and cooperation with Turkey because, it’s a common belief 
throughout Greek policy makers it is a win-win deal for both sides. Indeed, Greece 
remains a steadfast supporter of Turkish membership in the EU. Nonetheless, new 
thinking currents prevail in Athens on how to deal with Turkey. This tendency is 
expressed perfectly by the Vegetius “De Re Militari” (4th or 5th century AD) tract that 
states: “If you want to have peace, you must always be prepared for war”, a proverb 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Even though the activity in the fossil fuels sector in Greece is an old one, the country 
today is one of the most unexplored regions in the East Mediterranean.  
A wave of real enthusiasm had crushed the country after the recent developments in 
the region, signalling that Greece would be the next “big thing”, a significant player 
following Cyprus, Egypt and Israel’s gas success stories emergence. Finally Greece, all 
of a sudden has an impressive comeback since the mid 90’s with alleged rich reserves, 
though country was absent from the product scene for almost 15 years.  
The embodiment of a new legal and regulatory framework for hydrocarbons 
exploration, in the Greek Legislation in addition to the formation of the state-owned 
Hellenic Hydrocarbon Resources Management (HHRM) empowered to manage the 
rights of the State concerning to the exploration and exploitation, formatted the great 
“come back” of Greek official interest to the gas exploration. 
Since 2012, successive Greek administrations have gradually granted an area of 78,000 
sq km (2.5 times the size of Belgium) for onshore and offshore exploration and 
exploitation, with lease contracts incorporating both stages. 
The first concessions that rapidly signed after two decades were relative to Western 
Greece sea sections. Later, in 2015 an international round and subsequent “Open 
Door” rounds followed, leading to the award of numerous concessions in Ionian Sea 
and Crete as well. Some oil major contractors such as Repsol, ExxonMobil and Total 
were involved in those concessions, and that was seen by the energy audiences and 
the public in Greece as a good omen for more activity. 
Contemporaneously and mainly due to a convenient narrative for many politicians and 
influential parties that emanated from the austerity era of Greece, a belief that 
country was the “golden goose” of energy with endless untapped reserves of gas, that 
were promising generation of billions of exchange, enough to seal the debts, exit the 
crisis and fill the treasuries, had been entrenched to the public. Big expectations were 
bred and although many experts were warning about the risk of overestimations, the 
unrealistic momentum had a window of opportunity, a tangible positive impact, but at 
a lower scale and on a prolonged timeline. 
The narrative of an “easy solution” to Greece’s economic anguishes may be enticing, 
especially in a country familiarized to discourses of simplistic silver bullet “solutions” to 
economic expansion.  However, in the current universal milieu, this unanimity 
approach is astoundingly narrow-minded, by missing out totally the complex 
economics of gas. Critically, it ignores the elephant in the room, videlicet, climate 
change mitigation, the consequences of the Paris Agreement for energy markets and 
the destiny of fossil fuel infrastructure and economy over the coming decades. 
Against all expectations and promises, since 2011 not a single drilling has been 
executed, not a well opened and Prinos, a 40-year old oilfield business, is still the only 
operating and producing oil-asset in Greece. In a world in the process of an energy 
transition that primes the pump to revolutionary developments, similar only to 
industrialization era, the crucial questions Greece’s policy makers and energy 
autonomy visionaries should ask themselves are the following: 
a. How strategically wise is, in economic terms, to invest in an incumbent fossil 
fuel industry, as opposed to NECP plotting and escape from specialising Greece’s 
economic tissue in clean energy, efficiency and storage technologies? 
  -65- 
b. What is the possibility for these investments to result in stranded assets while 
fastening Greece into energy sources whose lucrativeness may expectantly decay over 
the coming years? 
c. Whether these investments end up stranding, are paybacks worth the 
considerable environmental and socio-economic risks they pose, particularly compared 
to clean energy alternatives?      
 According to IPCC’s dominant scenario is that, worldwide, oil and gas use will 
need to decline by 54% and 37% respectively by 2050, relative to 2020 levels. This 
moderate extrapolation accepts a significant room for CCS (Carbon Capture and 
Storage). With less or no room for CCS technologies, the drop should be much steeper 
– a 93% and 88% decline in oil and gas consumption respectively- relative to 2020 
levels. 
  From a financial side, the complete question is whether there is space for the 
advance of new oil and gas fields. The answer is dull: if we are to keep global 
temperatures from rising above 1.5°C – or even above the much more alarming 
threshold of 2°C - there is little space for the growth of new fields, even when 
accounting for the natural decline rate of existing ones.     
In fact, according to academic research published in Nature website, the full 
exploitation of existing (proven) reserves would overreach the Paris agreement 
emissions targets. Thus meaning, to meet a target of 2 °C, “a third of oil reserves, half 
of gas reserves and over 80 per cent of current coal reserves should remain unused”. 
Investors have already started noticing and fly a kite to market’s tendencies. The 
below events are likely to result quite soon: 
a. A steep decline of consumption (through regulation policies, extensive carbon 
pricing, and competition from RES that are becoming gradually competitive) will 
probably generate lower prices, eating into the projected profitability of the oil and gas 
industry, and forcing the most expensive fields out of the market. In contrast with 
what some may assume, gas is no exception to this.      
b. Even crucially, new projects that haven’t sunk their upfront capital costs are at 
high risk of stranding, while higher cost sources – for example shale, deep and ultra-
deep water come second.  
Over the last few years, the oil and gas industry have undergone some vital changes 
which have dictated a gloomier view for the global upstream investment. Now, the 
question raised lately is whether Greece has missed the energy “train of gas”, and the 
opportunity to tap its natural resources was diminished. Εspecially in the current 
worse oil price milieu How and the continuing spread of oil majors, which are 
displacing global interest towards greener energy. 
After a moderately stable and high oil price reality, with trading prices around $100 
per barrel between 2011 and 2014, fossil fuel sector entered turmoil and remains 
there since. Shale revolution that led to nose-diving of the oil prices in 2014 and force 
OPEC to historical coordinated production cuts, the desirable market-stabilization had 
a great impact on oil upstream industry giants’ investment plants. Engaged in an 
exploration investments reduction-price dropping spiral, companies experienced 
inevitably a further recession and acceleration of swirling which led to halving the 
investments in the sector on early 2018. 
Just a couple of years later, the final hit has been given by the outbreak of Covid-19. 
The pandemic has caused a momentous demolition of oil and gas demand, 
unavoidably forcing the oil majors to sizable cost-cutting measures. In their struggle to 
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control finances, the companies proceed to lowering exploration budgets, a fact that is 
likely to culminate in a harder competition for global upstream investment.  
Covid-19 seems also to have hastened another interesting tendency. Giant oil 
companies are now branching out into new sectors more sophisticated with low 
carbon technologies and are heading to greener net-zero emissions by 2050. Even the 
fresh US administration re-joined the Paris Agreement showing the pathway that 
energy economy has to follow. 
While the fossil fuel sector experiences a hostile environment, clean-energy 
investment plans seem to remain undamaged – at least for now – introducing a new 
opponent to the ongoing competition, the renewables. 
In evaluating the fiscal prospects of gas in Greece, timing is essential. Undeniably, even 
if assuming that any significant reserves are discovered and are recoverable, no major 
field is expected to operate before the mid-2020s – while some may not start before 
the late 2020s. This noticeably surges the risk of these investments stranding as, by 
2030, the severity of climate policies to oil and gas industry will be present; while 
novelty and the ongoing tumbling costs of clean energy, storage technologies and 
electric vehicles will eventually set hydrocarbons uncompetitive. 
There is a high risk, even if Greece’s fields are eventually developed, they will probably 
produce little value, for a limited time period, and will conceivably face the jeopardy of 
premature mothballing.      
In our effort to provide answers to the topical debate about pros and cons of the gas 
drilling in the territorial waters and EEZ, it’s time now for a handful of matters to be 
clarified and seriously discussed: 
a. Timing was always a serious parameter and historically the paradigm of coal 
affirms this adage. Drilling for energy business in Greece in the mid 20’s is not similar 
to drilling in Norway in the 70’s of the previous century (a country which along with 
Denmark was always illustrated as “role model” in the energy sector by inland 
politicians and business influencers). 
b. Second, Greece’s operations will face the risk of stranding, provided their low 
deployment and the deep and ultra-deep nature of the majority of concessions in the 
Ionian Sea and Crete. 
c. Third, as analyzed above and in previous chapters, parleys of ample economic 
benefits are enormously exaggerated. Current and near future oil prices along with 
extraction costs will be the basis upon which any gas royalties received by Greek State 
will be calculated. Declining demand, which will be among other factors the reason 
that prices will keep on dropping, shall foist rather fiscally insignificant tax revenues. 
Yet, this to happen, it assumes profitable production, which is far from evident, not to 
mention the strong likelihood that oil companies will require subventions to maintain 
profitability and keep the business alive. 
d. Fourth, Greece does not contain a wide technological spectrum that enables 
specialization in a rather fading energy sector without mislaying capability in other 
sectors and technologies. Renovating its economic tissue in the expense of mobilizing 
resources (human, financial, material) might prove to end up in deadlock. High skilled 
human capital and skyrocketing public investment budgets are linked to hard 
opportunity costs for an endeavour of that range. 
e. Last of all, if the above proves right, we are dealing with a high-risk–low-return 
venture. Gas drilling is a severely polluting business that might inexorably downgrade 
Greece’s natural capital. Also it might bring economic deeds reliant on sturdy marine 
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and coastal ecosystems, such as fisheries and tourism, in jeopardy in regions where 
50% to 75% of yearly incomes count on those. Any serious assessment requires 
questioning whether these are worth forfeiting for an economic activity whose future 
feasibility and profitability projections show doubtful.  
Despite the gloomier outlook, not all investment is expected to desiccate for the global 
upstream industry. The oil and gas sector is used to work in a cyclical fashion and has 
experienced vivid cyclical fluctuations in the past. For operators, current market 
conditions dictate a worthy occasion to commit capital budgets as bills in the upstream 
supply chain are at a historic low. However, even under the setup of a rougher crisis 
this time, motivated by noteworthy efficiency gains, the net zero movement and the 
Covid-19 repercussions, that will see the role of oil dwindling, it is expected that oil 
remains the dominant fuel in the foreseeable future, while natural gas continues 
gaining a larger share in the global energy mix, playing an important role in the 
decarbonisation phase, specifically in the EU market. 
On the latter, Greece has a comparative advantage, thanks to its closeness to Europe. 
Monetization of its gas reserves would simply mean an opening to an alternative gas 
supply route for EU, thus contributing not only to its energy security but also to its 
strategic goals for diversification and decarbonization. 
Undoubtedly gas resources would also assist country to raise its ranking in the EU 
energy dependence map, where for now is standing at the low 70%, well below EU’s 
55% average 
While Greece has efficaciously managed to draw the interest of big oil and gas players, 
in spite of the adversarial environment due to lower oil prices, it appears that 
renewables, for which the country has great potential, have in some way, demoted the 
attention to hydrocarbons as the state’s priorities seem to turn to the wider 
development of green energy. That was stressed through the submission of the 10-
year National Plan for Energy and Climate (NEPC) to the EU Commission in December 
2019, which not only delineated the government’s commitment to the bloc’s wider 
pledge for transition to a greener economy, but more significantly, it highlighted the 
aspiring elevation of renewables in the country’s energy mix to 35% of total energy 
consumption by 2030, up from about 13% currently. 
Notwithstanding the potential to the gas exploration and the benefits from 
exploitation we must stand to a critical point: Such gas and energy projects in general, 
as we also demonstrated with EastMed presentation, require large scale investments 
and about 5 to 7 years at least to develop, which automatically marginalizes the 
beneficial and profitable period to about two decades, which for projects of that 
magnitude is considered narrow. Beyond endless intercourses in and out of the 
country’s borders among policy makers and decision centers one is for sure. If Greece 
and its officials means its exploitation plans and has strong will to commercialize its 
national wealth and gain economic benefits by converting the country to an energy 
hub, they must act now.  
The boundary delimitations (EEZ agreements) with Egypt and Italy, the Energy 
Ministry’s approval of the strategic environmental impact study for south of Crete that 
will pave the way for tendering licenses and the revamp of the HHRM SA, are definitely 
signs and developments that reveal that Greece may skittishly shift towards this 
direction, however a much stronger and dynamic determination and action is what it 
takes for the country to meet its energy destiny. 
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Greece must remain attractive and competitive to reach the vision of exploitation of its 
energy resources. Focusing only on the best resource opportunities, it must show 
strong momentum and expedite exploration in order to step over other major gas 
projects across the globe. Any possible bureaucratic obstacles should be overcome and 
eliminated and terms on offer shall reflect the current market realities. Keeping pace 
both to the above scopes and the NECP as well, might be quite challenging for the 
current and forthcoming administrations, however its of uttermost importance and 
priority in order country to fulfill its commitments and not giving up its energy destiny 




A few months ago, during a “Circle of Ideas for National Reconstruction” think tank 
conference, was announced an esteem of gas field “Talos” south of Crete that might 
reach up to 10 trillion cubic feet (tcf). Tapping this quantity would allegedly solve 
country’s energy equation for up to 70 years. The statement almost immediately had 
been downplayed by Hellenic Petroleum officials and the anticipated handling from the 
press and policymakers was modest, bespeaking that HP view was totally realistic. 
Most commonly, this diffident mindset was a constant over-time in Greek politics 
reality, a standpoint often and effortlessly passed to vox pop approval at no cost. When 
it comes to energy rights - and sometimes territorial ones – after the thunderstorm of 
willingness and the dithyrambic declarations of country’s capacity and determination on 
claiming and exploiting its property, comes the unwillingness and incapacity of 
consecutive Greek administrations to undertake their responsibilities and materialize the 
statements.  
Even though Covid-19 has spread its opaqueness spectrum over the globe and frosted 
energy decisions and activities in all levels, this catholic state introversion serves Greek 
interests in an interesting and unique way; options are quite straightforward now for 
Greece. While numerous reconnaissance discussions have taken place during past times 
and even the time this course work is being written another round is being conducted, 
the low expectancy of this diplomatic line is far pre-determined. No matter if Turkey 
boycotts its own “effort” of convergence by launching threats and repeating illegitimate 
doctrines, while “discussing” by the aegis of International Justice, in Greece politicians 
and governmental officials breed no delusions.  
However, in the actions course, Greece is still an observer, a quite passive watcher a 
“thinker” if not a dreamer, but definitely not a “doer”. By assuming that diplomacy will 
once again return no remarkable results, Greece has actually been left with a pair of 
options. 
If the ongoing discussions, which are fully informal (no minutes-no decisions) lead to 
formatting a potential crypto-negotiation scheme, that will redirect the dispute to an 
International Court, this by no means shall be considered a securitized turn for the 
country’s interests. Strategically-wise this movement though it seems rational, it is not 
esteemed as worthwhile. Whether it’ll be the International Court of Justice in Hague or 
the International Tribune for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, there is simply no 
warranty that Greece will succeed in its anticipated targets with the legitimacy of the 
Courts. No matter if Athens will support its claims and positions with resounding 
substantiation, utilizing UNCLOS provisions can be a dynamic potential which in front 
of the Court’s jurisdiction may fade or upturn.  
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Even further, it may be proven that “Median Line” that Greece suggests for delineation 
methodology over “proportionality criteria” will not be adopted by Court, rendering 
Athens’ aspirations in vacuum. Moreover, such a procedure in an International Court’s 
timing rules would be exhaustingly long and may leave numerous sub-issues unsettled 
or “…to be clarified” bilaterally. Consequently, this will bring inevitably, further delay 
to the belated Greece’ initiatives for gas exploration in the region. 
Even if the Court ended up to a crystal-clear and undoubtedly verdict with no ground 
left for appeals, no one could take Turkey’s approbation and compliance for granted. 
It’s not far from typical for Turkey’s stance, a behavior common to China’s at South 
China Sea; a violation of a Court’s decision if substantial interests of Ankara’s are at 
stake.  
Greece must realize that postponing its course of actions, is not going to feeze a 
confrontation contingency to the future for ever. Even worse, it may be signaling to 
Turkey that it fears or has substantial and vital reasons to avoid such an opposition and 
therefore it is a false signaling towards a revisionist neighbor to be more oppressive and 
assertive. Hence, Athens must call the Turkey’s bluff. There may be second thoughts 
that the armament campaign that is now under development will upgrade its negotiating 
status, but the current situation in Turkey indicates it might not be extra time for this 
progress. 
If hypothetically speaking, Athens, by acknowledging that EEZ demarcation with Egypt 
has unloaded its fully potential, proceeds now to bilateral delineation with Cyprus, 
under the observance and approval of Israel and current Egyptian “neutrality”, along 
with EMGF countries acceptance, then Turkey, given its social, fiscal, geopolitical and 
domestic security constraints will refrain from going to a “full scale war”, as Greek 
Gen. Floros stated, leaving no space for localized hostilities to the Turkish side and 
forsaking the doctrine of proximity war inexorably. Furthermore, it wouldn’t take the 
risk of jeopardizing its international standing and seek for military opposition against a 
NATO “ally” state. Keeping up with a low risk-high return strategy, such as “casus 
belli” at literally no cost, political or fiscal, is quite sensible and well minded for 
Ankara’s concerns, especially since Greece succumbs to that continuous threat and 
retreats.  
On the contrary, Erdogan knowing its country’s too many loose ends would never 
proceed to an irrational military opposition, given the above circumstances. 
Borrowing the Operational Planning Military Theory terminology we can say that the 
center of gravity for the future plans in geopolitical standpoint is a tiny Greek island in 
south Mediterranean, Kastellorizo. This European south-easternmost end is the Greek 
sovereignty cornerstone which, after the recent demarcation with Egypt, attracts the full 
interest of the opposed counterparts. Not ignoring Kastellorizo’s sovereignty influence 
to its EEZ formation, Greece must be determined and decisive and either proceed to 
bilateral agreement with Cyprus or alternatively establish a unilateral EEZ 
announcement, which will enshrine its rights on Eastern Mediterranean for future 
potential explorations and exploitation. This option should be the most appropriate in 
terms of smart and lithe diplomacy. On the contrary, by ignoring Kastellorizo’s full 
effect, Athens will be opening Pandora’s Box and suicidally legalize all Turkish claims 
on Eastern Mediterranean while quitclaiming a serious legal advantage to Turkey for 
any future use. 
In relation to the recent geopolitical experience, Greece is unlikely to hold a robust 
attitude towards Turkey and act decisively. Most likely it will attempt to further delay 
the procedure of gas exploration, by claiming that environmental issues may arise, 
flaring up the local discourse of turning towards an eco-friendly RES, in exchange of 
drilling in the Aegean and East Mediterranean, thus ignoring the geostrategic 
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importance of claiming the country’s vested rights. Red herring and public opinion 
manipulation techniques might be marshalled in order to distract and downplay the 
significance of defending country’s energy rights in the expense of passively distancing 
from confrontations and emanating “risks”. Even worse the possibility of joint 
exploration, invoked as a “win-win” agreement by decision makers, to bring prosperity 
and peace to both Aegean coasts, serves perfectly the Turkish expansionism. 
Nevertheless, this development can be projected to Greek people as a modest victory 
that would eventually lead a deserted and abandoned maritime area to produce wealth-
even shared-conceding Turkey a considerable portion of gains from the Aegean and 
South Mediterranean Sea potentials, depriving them from the Greek energy sector 
permanently.  
Latest developments have Ankara and Athens re-approaching, opening the so called 
“Investigative Contacts” and “Exploratory Talks” circles. With little or no faith at all, 
these talks are expected to go up in smoke. Both sides know this obvious inglorious end 
however they proceed to dialogue. Ankara is serving publicly and openly its outrageous 
agenda, full of irrational and insulting claims and assertions, while Athens might be 
buying time. However time, is a relative constraint and past geopolitical patterns might 
not be repeated this time.  
A Greek proverb says: “You cannot hold two watermelons under the same armpit”. 
Greece, by trying to follow its NECP objectives, being obedient to EU Green Deal 
policies and goals, serving the EMGF interests while propelling its way through the 
churning waters of East Mediterranean, goes far beyond this saying. This multitasking 
mission requires the intellectual leaders of this country to be ubiquitous and 
inspirational to envisage a timeless national vision for Greek people. It also demands 
individual and collective willingness and a 20-year strategic master plan, to be served 
by consensus. After two hundred years from its liberation Greek State can reprise a tour 
de force. Celebrating its bicentennial reawakening, its time Greece bore its historical 
onuses and took action towards a prosperous future for its people. Energy in the form of 
rich gas reserves, deposited well beneath under eastern Mediterranean seabed can 
ascertain this perspective. 
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Appendix 
List of Abbreviations 
 
bcm Billion Cubic Meters 
bcm/y Billion Cubic Meters per Year 
bcma Billion Cubic Meters per Annum 
BTE Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum Pipeline 
CEF Connecting Europe Facility Program 
EGMF Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum 
EASTMED Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
ENTSOG European Network of Transmission System Operators of Gas 
EU European Union 
FLNG Floating Liquified Natural Gas 
FSRU Floating Storage and Regasification Unit 
HHRM Hellenic Hydrocarbon Resources Management (S.A) 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IGA Intergovernmental Agreement 
IGB Interconnector Greece – Bulgaria Pipeline 
IGI Interconnector Greece – Italy Pipeline 
ITG Interconnector Turkey – Greece Pipeline 
km Kilometres 
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LNG Liquified Natural Gas 
Mod Ministry of Defence 
MoU Memorandum Understanding 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NAVTEX(es) Navigational Telex(es) 
NECP National Energy and Climate Plan  
NG Natural Gas 
nm nautical miles 
PA Palestinian Authority  
PCI Projects of Common Interest 
PRE-FEED Pre – Front – End Engineering Design 
SCP South Caucasus Pipeline 
SGC Southern Gas Corridor 
TANAP Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline 
TAP Trans Adriatic Pipeline 
tcf Tril  
TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law Of the Sea 
 
 
